

# **Knowledge on Fire: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan**

## **Risks and Measures for Successful Mitigation**

**September 2009**



CARE International in Afghanistan and the Afghan Ministry of Education gratefully acknowledge the financial, technical, and moral support of the World Bank as the initiator and champion of this study, and in particular, Asta Olesen and Joel Reyes, two dedicated members of the Bank's South Asia regional Team. We would further like to thank all of the respondents who gave of their time, effort, and wisdom to help us better understand the phenomenon of attacks on schools in Afghanistan and what we may be able to do to stop it.

*The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.*

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*This study was conducted by CARE on behalf of the World Bank and the Ministry of Education, with the assistance of CoAR/OSDR.*

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## **1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Purpose of this study**

"Stop teaching and running the girls' school, otherwise you will be slaughtered." That was the message sent to the Headmaster of a girls' school in Logar, just south of Kabul, when unknown masked gunmen took him out of his house late one evening and beat him up. The attacks on schools, students and education personnel are an alarming trend in Afghanistan.

This study was conducted in a desire to better understand the nature of threats and attacks on education and offer recommendations for improving the ability of stakeholders to mitigate, and whenever possible, prevent, future attacks, with particular regard to the participation of communities in that process. Communities in Afghanistan are largely involved in the management and daily life of schools, as well as in their protection.

Specifically, through an analysis of the nature of attacks and possible ways to mitigate risks by increased community involvement in protection of schools, the report seeks to contribute to: (i) increased security for students, teachers and other education personnel, (ii) increased community involvement in and responsibility for school management, (iii) improved enrollment of students.

The research consisted of three main parts: a literature review of relevant secondary sources, including an analysis of the Ministry of Education and UNICEF databases on school attacks; interviews with key stakeholders within the education sector; and a field study.

Data collection was conducted by CoAR in eight provinces of Afghanistan: Logar, Khost, Kunar, Wardak, Ghazni, Herat, Balkh and Kapisa. A total of 1,037 individual and group interviews were conducted among Ministry of Education officers, Ministry of Education provincial department heads, representatives from the NGO community, parents, police officers, school principals, members of local *shuras* (community councils), teachers at different levels, and students. A total of 4,819 people were involved in the field exercise. Due to security concerns for the people that participated in this exercise, the exact villages and schools visited will not be revealed publicly.

The databases that were used to analyze the dynamics of attacks have shown not to be 100% accurate, as discovered during the field data collection. Under-reporting, wrong information and partial information on attacks do not give the complete picture of all attacks. There are also certain inconsistencies within the figures generated by the databases themselves. Nevertheless, it is believed that the information they contain offer a strong reflection of the realities on the ground, even if they are not 100% accurate.

The following is a brief summary of the content of the report.

### **General insecurity**

When analyzing the phenomenon of attacks on the education sector in Afghanistan, it is important to place the phenomenon in the context of a general spread of insecurity across the country. The large majority of field survey respondents retain that the general security situation in their areas has deteriorated. Causes of insecurity vary across the provinces, but can largely be attributed to the armed opposition and criminal activity. With regards to specific threats to the education sector, most respondents indicated that the threats emanated from armed opposition and criminal groups, although significant provincial variation was noted – a key finding for the assessment.

### **Nature of attacks**

Throughout 2008 alone, 670 attacks on the Afghan education system were carried out including arson and the murder of teachers and students.<sup>1</sup> Between January 2006 and December 2008, 1153 attacks of different natures were reported: grenades, night letters or verbal threats to teachers, killings of students and education personnel. According to the Ministry of Education (MoE), 230 people died as a result of attacks on schools, students and personnel between 2006 and 2007.

The most frequent type of attack according to the UNICEF school security database is arson, where school buildings, tents or inventory was burned. Explosions in or near schools buildings (including throwing of grenades, mines and rocket attacks) and direct attacks against students or education personnel are also common. Twenty percent of education personnel interviewed in the field assessment stated that they have been threatened.

Attacks on schools cannot be confined to a certain area of the country. The hardest hit provinces over the period in question are Kunar (95 attacks), Khost (91), Nangarhar (74), Helmand (72) and Kabul (72). However, the number of attacks in each province has varied throughout the period. While in 2006, the provinces that reported most attacks were Helmand, Khost, Kandahar and Ghazni; in 2007 these were Khost, Kunar, Herat and Wardak; and in 2008 Kunar, Kabul, Nangarhar and Khost. Very few provinces have seen a decrease or even a light increase in attacks throughout the period. Zabul and Ghor are the only two provinces that have seen a constant reduction between 2006 and 2008.

The nature of attacks varies from province to province. In some areas, arson is the most frequent form of attack, while in other areas, the attackers chose explosives. Grenades have been thrown in school windows and rockets fired at schools. Tents used for classes have been burnt down and children have been killed on their way home from school. Schools are more at risk at night and in the early months of the school year, although the latter trend has extended further into the school term with each passing year.

### **Risk factors**

Girls' education is clearly targeted more than boys; findings from this research indicate that the main perpetrators against the education of girls are the armed insurgency or internal community members. Of all attacked schools, girls' schools account for 40%, while mixed schools (32%) and boys' schools (28%) make up for the rest. There are, however, less than half the number of girls' schools than boys' schools in the country, which clearly signals a gender bias in the attacks. Although hit proportionally less often, boys' schools and mixed schools are also clearly suffering from threats and attacks.

Attacks on schools can also occur due to their symbolic value as government entities, or because of their association with international military forces (visits or funding). Local conflicts and criminal opportunism are other reasons mentioned by respondents in the field study. In some cases the mere location of a school along a highway where regular armed fighting takes place means that the school gets caught in the cross-fire of conflict. Schools located along international borders have been cited as prime targets for incursions across the boarder.

NGO-supported schools seem to be less targeted than government-supported schools. The reasons for this could be numerous, but likely include the lack of government association and the untraditional (and therefore less visible) physical structure in which NGO schools are often established.

Not involving the community before the establishment of a school could also increase the risk of attacks. Schools seem to be less targeted where the community itself requested the school in the first place.

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<sup>1</sup>According to the Ministry of Education, February 2009.



### **Consequences of school insecurity**

Attacks on schools and the general insecurity throughout the country have serious negative impacts on the education sector. At the beginning of 2009, 670 schools were closed across the country. In southern provinces, between 65-81% of schools are currently closed due to insecurity. But closure of schools is not the only negative impact.

Insecurity also causes more parents to keep their children home from school in fear of their safety. According to respondents in the field study, girls' attendance suffers slightly more than boys after a security incident at their school. Thirty six percent of the respondents in the field study indicated that fewer girls have frequented the school after the threat; while 27% said that it had led to a reduction boys' attendance. Fortunately, attacks do not appear to have that serious of an impact on teachers' attendance. Male teachers were reported to have decreased their attendance by 3% of respondents after the incident and female teachers by 7% of respondents.

### **Community participation in school protection**

Afghan schools assessed through the field study do in the vast majority of cases have mechanisms for community participation: either in the management of the school or with the specific task of providing security. Unfortunately it was beyond the ability of this study to do an in-depth analysis of the effectiveness of the different protection mechanisms currently in place. That said, prevention and protection is beyond doubt regarded by respondents as a local community responsibility. Only a relatively small percentage indicated that the responsibility lies with government and the police. In fact, in some cases the presence of the police was considered detrimental to the wellbeing of the school, as in those areas they are considered primary attack targets themselves. Across the survey area, both the Afghan National Army and the international military forces are seen as irrelevant in the protection of schools.

The roles that respondents see for the communities are numerous, and clearly defined by the nature of the attack and the perpetrators behind it. Attacks linked to the armed conflict in the country are one clear type: in these instances the community is more likely to know the attacker or be able to open up a line of communication to them. Attacks linked to criminal groups are different: communities are much less likely to know or be able to open dialogue with this group. Fear is also a factor: although there is understandable hesitation amongst many communities to try to negotiate with armed insurgents, across the board respondents felt more fearful of relating to criminal groups. The roles they suggest as appropriate to play in these two very different kinds of instances are logically varied. Hiring guards and increasing patrolling are other suggestions from the community.

### **Prevented and mitigated attacks**

The number of prevented attacks has been low according to the field research; only 4% of respondents indicated that attacks had been prevented in the past. This, however, does not lessen the value of the success stories of communities. The stories that respondents tell can be divided in two main categories: some relate to the prevention of attacks or repeated attacks; while others focus on damage control when an attack occurs. In the first category, stories are related of local *shuras* having negotiated with the attackers both to prevent attacks and in the aftermath of an attack, obtaining positive results and promises of no future attacks. In the second category, respondents highlight episodes in which school guards of whole communities have engaged in firefights with attackers and put out fires that attackers had initiated. There is little information related to complete prevention, where there have been no attacks or threats. This is related to the difficulty in establishing what would have happened in the absence of certain protection variables. However, there is little doubt that communities see awareness raising of the positive effects of education as a key factor to preventing attacks, along with negotiations with hostile elements, without distinguishing whether attacks are imminent or not.

### **Risk mitigating measures**

Suggested solutions that came out of the more than 1,000 interviews in the field assessment were predominantly the establishment of school security *shuras* and general disarmament. Faith in increased police involvement in protection of schools differed widely from province to province, with no less than 16% believing that it would actually increase the risk of attacks. Additionally, involving the community from the very start of the school establishment process could be positive, both in ensuring community acceptance of the initiative, and in garnering their commitment to being involved in its protection.

### **Conclusion and Recommendations**

Various patterns emerged out of this study. They are as follows:

1. While the overall picture of attacks on schools across the country (if the present small survey area can be at all representative) may seem confused and chaotic, local patterns are in fact quite clear.
2. When the attack is thought to be perpetrated by the armed insurgency, communities are more likely to feel that lines of communication with attackers could be developed if they don't exist already, and that some negotiation could take place.
3. When the attack is thought to be perpetrated by criminal groups, community members often report a lack of any way of getting in touch with the attackers.
4. It appears that more attacks happen against girls' schools when the attackers are members of the armed opposition or internal community members.
5. The vast majority of communities feel that the main decision-making and roll-out responsibility of protection mechanisms must remain local.
6. Schools seem to be attacked nominally more often in those communities where there isn't a strong and unified sense of the importance of education borne by the communities themselves.

The overarching recommendation put forth by this report is that education stands the strongest chance of being optimally protected if the analysis, decision-making and implementation power of school security is decentralized to the provincial, district, and community levels, with budgetary and technical support offered by the central government. Further recommendations are broken down the community and central levels and with regards to the period of establishment or reopening of schools. They are as follows:

#### *Community level:*

1. Engage in proactive awareness-raising.
2. Increase the visible presence of security guards.
3. Top up mitigation measures at peak risk periods.
4. Engage in preventative negotiations.

#### *Central level:*

1. Provide support and training for communities on negotiation techniques and other risk mitigation measures.
2. Introduce a national education promotion campaign.
3. Consider the negotiation of a memorandum of understanding with the armed opposition.
4. Revise the policing policy as it pertains to schools.
5. Undertake database improvements.
6. Restrict PRT and broader military involvement in schools.
7. Review the School Guards Project.

#### *For the establishment and reopening of schools:*

1. Undertake community consultations.
2. Select discrete locations.
3. Where possible, select discrete school structures.

Finally, the following areas of further research were recommended:

- Best practices regarding community participation in the protection of schools should be gathered and learned from.
- Attack rates on different school structures (traditional schoolhouse versus community-based structures) must be analyzed.
- Those instances in which negotiation with hostile elements has led to the successful prevention of attacks should be thoroughly studied.
- Additional research should be conducted on the diverse drivers of attitudes towards education.

## 2 INTRODUCTION

Throughout 2008, 670 attacks on the Afghan education system were carried out: school buildings were burnt down, teachers and students were killed.<sup>2</sup> Between January 2006 and December 2008, 1,145 attacks of different natures were reported: grenades, night letters or verbal threats to teachers, the murder of students and education personnel. Education is under attack in Afghanistan.

Significant progress has been made in the Afghan education sector since the fall of the Taliban, the enrollment in Ministry of Education schools having increased from around 900,000 in 2001 to an estimated 6.1 million by the end of 2008.<sup>3</sup> Now, insecurity and the ban that opposition groups have placed on education are threatening the results achieved. The ranks of the newly-enrolled are dropping alarmingly fast thanks in large part to the daily deteriorating – and rapidly expanding – security situation. “The number of teachers and students killed in the past 10 months is nearly double the total casualties of last year”, authorities in the ministry of education said. “This year 651 schools were closed in southern provinces; 141 teachers and students were killed since beginning of the year; and 173,000 students dropped out off schools”, a spokesman for the Ministry of Education said at the end of 2008.<sup>4</sup> In some southern provinces as much as 81% of schools are closed.

**Over 1000 attacks on schools, teachers and students have occurred in three years; that’s an average of 33 per month**

The situation has caused a dilemma for parents: whether or not to send their children to school. Is education worth the risk their children may face by attending classes? This report will attempt to make sense of these trends by breaking down feature by feature the threats and attacks, their consequences, and their mitigation or actual prevention, shining a particular light on how community participation can reduce attacks on the education sector.

**Not a week goes by without an incident being reported**

As early as October 2006, President Karzai expressed concern about the hundreds of thousands of children out of school due to ongoing violence.<sup>5</sup> According to the Ministry of Education, 6% of schools were burned or closed down from June 2006 to December 2007,<sup>6</sup> and 103 teachers, principals, and MoE district staff were shot dead between January 2006 and April 2008.<sup>7</sup> One hundred ten students were killed at school sites or on their way home.<sup>8</sup> Not a week goes by without a security incident being reported to the Ministry of Education, which maintains a daily log of incidents, compiling it as a basis for

monthly analysis. The Ministry of Education is in several ways urging people to work with the government to help improve security, and is working hard to develop national mechanisms for school, teacher, and student protection, to keep education in Afghanistan alive.

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<sup>2</sup>According to the Ministry of Education, February 2009.

<sup>3</sup> Based on the information of the Planning Department, Ministry of Education.

<sup>4</sup> “651 schools close in southern Afghanistan”, Quqnoos, January 5, 2009.

<sup>5</sup> “Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan”, Human Rights Watch, Volume 18, Number 6 (c), July 2006, p.6.

<sup>6</sup> Ministry of Education official website, June 2008, <http://www.moe.af> (accessed June 10th, 2008).

<sup>7</sup> The data regarding killings from MoE differs from the various databases.

<sup>8</sup> MoE Database, Provincial Liaison Office, June 2008.

## 2.1 History

Afghanistan has a long history of attacks on schools. Beginning after the Communist coup in 1978, the school system became one of the primary victims of the decades-long conflict between the Soviet forces and Mujahideen. The new government, led by the pro-Moscow People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), pushed hard for increasing the enrollment rate and also launched an ambitious adult education program, which enthusiastic local party workers tried to force village women to attend. But the backlash in conservative Afghanistan proved unavoidable, and large parts of the existing educational infrastructure were specifically targeted and destroyed by the Mujahideen. While the Soviet-backed PDPA and the American-resourced Mujahideen used the education system to further their political aims, the quality of education suffered. The rural areas were hardest hit. With disruption of education, many teachers were killed and schools were destroyed. In 1983 the Afghan Foreign Minister admitted in the UN that 50% of schools in Afghanistan had been destroyed. In 2003 the Asian Development Bank estimated that 80% of all school buildings at all levels had been damaged or destroyed.

The violence against the education sector continued after the fall of the communist regime. The country entered into a civil war in which different factions of Mujahideen fought for power in different parts of the nation. The chaos caused many more schools to be closed or destroyed. Teachers and other educationalists fled Afghanistan, adding to the already precarious situation created during the PDPA regime. Girls' education particularly suffered.

The onset of the Taliban rule in the mid-nineties aggravated the situation as girls were banned from attending school. Despite the risk, a limited number of home schools for girls emerged and received support from NGOs and UN agencies around the country. Although the Taliban edict was rescinded in 2001, their influence continues. Last year, Taliban spokesman Qari Yusuf Ahmadi told reporters, "We have burnt some schools where anti-Islamic lessons were being taught", and he further condemned schools where children were taught "wrongly". "Many changes have been made to the textbooks. For instance, the letter A used to be for Allah but in these textbooks A is used for 'Anar' [pomegranate]. J used to be for Jihad, but these books have J for 'Jowar' [maize]. We do not permit such changes," he said.<sup>9</sup>

**"We burnt schools where anti-Islamic lessons were being taught" - Taliban**

Political strife, however, is not the only impetus of the tragic situation the Afghan education sector faces today. The decreasing hold of the central government on the rule of law around the country has opened space for criminal groups to take advantage of existing assets and infrastructure for their own ends; school damage has furthermore become the mark of internal community or tribal disputes. These diverse and often deeply rooted motivations of attack make even small achievements in school protection a hard-won accomplishment indeed.

## 2.2 Objective and outline of report

The present research was conducted to assess the specific local context of attacks on schools and to identify sustainable models for community involvement in their protection, resulting in (i) increased security for students and teachers, (ii) increased community involvement in and responsibility for school management, (iii) improved enrollment of students.

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<sup>9</sup> Interview with Radio Freedom.

The study is comprised of a desk study of relevant literature; analysis of the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and Ministry of Education (MoE) databases on attacks between January 1, 2006 through April 30, 2008, and the partial records available by the time of publication in August 2009; and a field assessment carried out in 6 provinces in Afghanistan (Herat, Balkh, Ghazni, Kapisa, Khost, Kunar, Logar and Wardak) in September/October 2008. The methodology used to carry out this project is outlined in chapter 3 of this report.

Threats to education are only one of many problems that Afghanistan faces in terms of security and as such cannot be analyzed and treated in isolation. Chapter 4 therefore offers a brief outline of the current security situation in the country and what respondents in the field assessment perceive to be the general causes of insecurity in their areas. Likewise, an analysis of what interviewees see to be the specific threats to the education sector is included in this section.

In chapter 5, the nature of attacks is outlined. Questions such as “what is attacked?”; “how?”; “where?” and “when?” are addressed in this section. The significant differences in the answers from one province to the next are outlined, and the importance of understanding and creating solutions based on these specific local factors is stressed. This is followed by chapter 6, which looks in closer detail at the consequences of attacks on the education sector; particularly how attacks impact on the continuity of educational services and the attendance of students and teachers.

Chapter 7 considers how communities have prevented attacks in the past and what they believe to be the solutions to school insecurity. It also offers a brief review of the other school protection mechanisms in place and the community’s perspective regarding their current and potential effectiveness.

Fundamental to the purpose of this study is to suggest possible recommendations for attack mitigation and prevention. Chapter 8 presents a final analysis of the situation and proffers several recommendations for effectively tackling these challenges in the coming months and years. In chapter 9, annexes outline the profiles of those provinces studied in the field assessment in terms of types of threats and attacks summarize the field data analyzed.

### 3 METHODOLOGY

#### 3.1 Overview

This research consisted of three main stages: a desk study comprising a literature review of relevant secondary sources, as well interviews with key stakeholders within the education sector regarding attacks on schools; a field study; and a finalization stage where key stakeholders were involved in reviewing the initial analysis and refining recommendations.

#### 3.2 Desk study

The literature review was comprised of data from the Ministry of Education (MoE) and United Nations' Children Fund (UNICEF), Afghanistan NGO Security Office (ANSO) reports, news articles and other reports on the issue. Quantitative data from the Ministry of Education and UNICEF databases, in addition to interviews with key stakeholders in the education sector<sup>10</sup>, was used to derive the pattern of attacks and direct the field assessment.<sup>11</sup>

#### 3.3 Field study

The NGO Coordination of Afghan Relief (CoAR) undertook the quantitative data collection and conducted focus group discussions in eight provinces of Afghanistan: Logar, Khost, Kunar, Wardak, Ghazni, Herat, Balkh and Kapisa.<sup>12</sup> The criteria for the provincial selection were:

- concentration of attacks
- geographical coverage
- accessibility

A total of 1037 interviews (both individual and group) were conducted in 36 districts across 8 provinces as shown in the table below.

**Provinces and Districts visited**

Balkh	Ghazni	Herat	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Sholgara	Qara Bagh	Herat Center	Tagab	Musa Khel	Narang	Baraki Barak	Sayd Abad
Chimtal	Dih Yak	Injil	Nijrab	Khost Center	Chawkay	Logar Center	Maidan
Balkh Center	Muqur	Kohsan	Alasay	Ali Sheer	Sirkanay	Mohammad Aqha	Jalrez
Nahri Shahi	Ghazni Center	Shindand		Qalandar	Khas Kunar		Nirkh
Dihdadi		Kashk Rubat Sangi		Ismael Khel			Jilga
				Gurbuz			Chak

Table 3.3.1 gives an overview of the provinces and districts visited in the field assessment.

<sup>10</sup> For the purpose of this study several key people within the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, UNICEF and aid agencies involved in the education sector such as CARE, International Rescue Committee (IRC), Swedish Committee, Aga Khan Development Network and Save the Children UK, were interviewed. The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC), who have also conducted field research related to the education sector, was also interviewed and discussions were held with Human Rights Watch. In the inception phase of the study, both national and international staff interviewed were mainly located in their respective Kabul headquarters. The field study also includes interviews with field level MoE and NGO staff.

<sup>11</sup> The UNICEF database was used to a larger extent than the database of the Ministry of Education because of the level of detail provided.

<sup>12</sup> The data collection exercise was carried out by a team of 22 interviewers and supervisors between September 3 and October 11, 2008. The province of Kandahar was dropped due to insecurity.

Due to security concerns for the people that participated in this exercise, the exact villages and schools visited will not be revealed publicly.

A total of 559 focus group interviews were conducted with teachers, parents, students and *shura* members. The number of people in these groups varied between 7 and 10 and consisted of respondents selected on the basis of factors of homogeneity (i.e. all students or all teachers). Additionally 455 individual interviews with parents, the provincial education department, NGOs, the police department and district education department were conducted in all 8 provinces. The table below shows the number of interviews conducted with the various groups/individuals in the different provinces.

Number of conducted individual interviews / focus group discussions									
	total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
students	198	25	29	26	20	23	25	25	25
teachers	202	25	28	23	23	25	26	29	23
principals	158	20	20	22	20	19	19	20	18
district officers	31	3	5	4	3	4	4	2	6
provincial heads	15	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1
shura	155	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	18
parents	231	28	38	29	23	29	25	32	27
NGO	11	2	2	2	0	3	1	0	1
police	19	3	0	3	1	3	3	0	6
NA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Table 3.3.2 outlines the number of interviews conducted with the various groups of respondents per province.

1020 out of 1037 interviews were conducted successfully, while 13 people that were approached refused to provide interviews. All refusals came from police officers.

In each table in the remainder of the report, the bottom row, (N), indicates the number of actual respondents to the number of total possible respondents in each province. In many instances (N) will be a lesser number than the total, as not all respondents were asked all questions. For example, some questions were posed exclusively to education *shuras* or teachers, such as in those instances where the question required their personal experience or expert knowledge.

### Conditioned Sampling

The schools visited in the field exercise were selected based on the number of attacks that occurred in the province, and a weight factor was used to select schools for the targeted district. A tentative list of schools in each district to include in the study (containing 14 attacked or threatened schools, 3 schools that had not experienced threats or attacks and 3 that had prevented attacks<sup>13</sup>) was developed. However, as the survey team experienced when collecting the data, the list of schools prepared on the basis of the Ministry of Education security database and UNICEF databases were often incorrect: 1) there were differences between reported names of schools and the real name; 2) some schools had been threatened but were not mentioned in the databases; 3) some schools that had been destroyed, burned or threatened according to the databases were in fact not. In consultation with the district or provincial education departments, survey teams changed these schools to schools with the same criteria. Additionally, security concerns for the survey team, was a considerable factor in choosing the final sites. Thus a particular school in a district was chosen largely based on accessibility in terms of security, in close consultation with provincial and district education departments. Despite all these challenges, only in Kunar did the survey team not manage to visit the full 20 schools, but had to settle with 19.

<sup>13</sup> If schools where attacks had been prevented were not available in the province, an alternative school was chosen based on the recommendation of the district education departments.



Total number of schools assessed									
	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak	Total
Girls	8	4	5	2	0	2	6	5	32
Boys	9	11	12	17	18	11	10	13	101
Mixed	3	5	3	0	0	3	0	2	16
NA	1	1	1	0	2	3	3	3	14
Total	21	21	21	19	20	19	19	23	163

Table 3.3.3 shows the number of boys', girls' and mixed schools visited in the field study.

**Research tools**

A questionnaire for the collection of quantitative and qualitative data from the individual interviews and focus group questions was developed. This questionnaire was the basis for the field study. Questions were constructed in a way that optimized their understandability to interviewees and would be easy to answer. Slightly different questionnaires were used for the different groups in order to ensure relevance and understanding. The overall questionnaire, containing all questions asked, is contained in annex C. The research team’s safety and security was seriously considered when developing the questions and shaping the field research. The names of respondents, organizations and their affiliation with any political party remained anonymous. The anonymity policy and the intended use of responses were fully explained to respondents.

The survey teams consisted of one team leader and two surveyors. In Herat and Balkh, a female surveyor, who was accompanied by a *mahram* (escort), was added to the team. Team leaders were responsible for conducting the survey as well as to supervise surveyors, check their completed forms, and conduct meetings with provincial and district authorities. CoAR/OSDR’s field coordinator also checked the field work randomly and cross checked the completed forms. The data collected was coded and entered using EpiInfo software. To minimize error, a double data entry procedure was followed.

**Constraints in the data collection process**

As insecurity was a major problem during the data collection process, female surveyors largely refused to travel to the areas into which the field team had to go, thus limiting the possibility of a gender balanced sample. In Herat and Balkh, female teams did conduct surveys. However in the remaining provinces female participation was largely dependent of those cases where male surveyors could conduct interviews with female interviewees.

Gender composition of completed interviews - total number of interviewees			
	Individual interviews	Focus groups	Total male/female
Male	388	3607	3995
Female	67	757	824
Total number of interviewees	455	4364	4819

Table 3.3.4 shows the gender composition of individual and focus group interviews in the field assessment.

Insecurity put constraints on the survey team and had a significant impact on the methodology chosen. The very purpose of this project was to go into insecure areas where attacks on schools are a big problem. Reliance on local hired staff was in most areas the only viable option for the research team, which decreased the level of direct supervision of teams.

### **3.4 Peer & stakeholder consultations**

To ensure the robustness of the analysis and the veracity of the recommendations, the initial findings and first draft of this report were shared with key stakeholders through several meetings (the Kabul education cluster, the partners meeting of the Partnership Advancing Community Based Education in Afghanistan (PACE A) as well as individual meetings with the Ministry of Education).

### **3.5 Considerations on the available and gathered data**

This report relies on two different kinds of statistical data: the data collected in the field survey, and the nation-wide data on school enrollment, closures, attacks and threats collected by the Ministry of Education (henceforth MoE) and UNICEF. All figures referencing informants, perceptions, and opinions are taken from the data produced by the survey. All national figures are derived from the UNICEF and MoE databases. No attempt was made to correlate these two sources: the national figures are included to contextualize the survey findings and shed light on the overall trend of attacks on schools; the survey findings have been designed to understand those trends in much greater depth in limited areas of the country and do not attempt to generalize findings past the survey area.

Both the national and the survey data sets have natural limitations which are presented below.

#### **Databases**

The UNICEF and Ministry of Education database formats used to analyze the dynamics of attacks do not perfectly coincide, nor do their numbers always match. This observation, together with the verification undertaken in survey areas during the field study, indicates that the data recorded in those systems is not 100% accurate. Under-reporting, misreporting and partial information on attacks do not give the complete picture of attacks on schools in Afghanistan. Moreover, both systems face the risk of counting episodes more than once due to lack of exact data related to the name of school, locations, and sometimes dates. There are clear examples of such possible double counting in the databases. Additionally, in some cases, multiple incidents that happened the same day are considered as one attack. If an explosion was carried out close to a school on the same day an MoE staff member was threatened in their home, for example, the episodes are often counted as a single incident.

#### **Field assessment**

First, in order to appreciate the correct value of the findings this report offers, it is important to highlight that the statistics presented are largely based on the *perceptions* of the interviewees. For example, it was not possible to calculate exactly how many children stopped going to school after each threat or attack; what was collected is a general sense from communities and key informants about the *perceived* changes in school attendance trends. The results are therefore not to be considered as statistical evidence of the impact of attacks on education, but rather what people understand those impacts to be from their individual standpoints.

Second, the survey was limited by the amount of detail it was able to draw related to the exact nature and the reasons behind specific attacks. Since there was no mechanism incorporated in the questionnaires to control which episode respondents were referring to, the same episode may be mentioned by several respondents, often with slightly different interpretations of the event.

Third, it is important to remember that the survey was conducted only in those provinces which were safe for the research teams to visit, and where potentially sensitive topics might be discussed. The provinces most disrupted by the current conflict – indeed, the same provinces that suffer from the greatest number of attacks on schools and school closures – were not considered in the survey. The broad conclusions and recommendations of this report should therefore not be automatically considered appropriate for all

regions of the country, nor do they attempt to be. Regions at the heart of the current violence require specific analysis relevant to their context and most likely the consideration of extraordinary measures if those schools are to be kept open and protected.

Fourth, an elevated margin of imprecision must be allowed for data derived from informant answers to certain questions, particularly surrounding the perceived origin of attacks (internal to the community? External? Armed insurgency? Criminal group?) and whether the community is in contact with the presumed assailants. It can be assumed that a percentage of such answers will be distorted by the perceived risk the informant could have felt in offering what he or she might consider uncomfortable or revealing information. In all sensitive cases, the option “I don’t know” was allowed as a valid response in the questionnaire.

## 4 SCHOOL SECURITY IN A CONTEXT OF NATIONAL INSECURITY

When analyzing the phenomenon of attacks on the education sector in Afghanistan it is essential to contextualize the problem within the national security situation. The two factors that must be borne in mind are:

- Overall security trends: is security improving or deteriorating in Afghanistan? Is this trend consistent across the country?
- National vs. local dynamics: what are the causes of insecurity? Are there more than one? Do these factors play out consistently across the country, or do they differ from province to province, from locality to locality?

### 4.1 Security trends across the country

According to the annual Afghanistan survey of the Asia Foundation, Afghans identify insecurity as the biggest problem facing the country.<sup>14</sup> In another recent study conducted by the Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium (HRRAC), 63% of respondents said they believe security had worsened in their home area over the past four years.<sup>15</sup>




Diagram 4.1.1. shows the distribution of responses in the field assessment regarding the changes in the security situation over the past two years. N=1015.

In the present field study, 71% of respondents believe that the general security situation has deteriorated in their parts of the country. Only 3% claim it has improved, while the remaining 26% believe that it has not changed.

These broad-picture statistics only take us so far towards understanding how insecurity has grown in Afghanistan, however. The Asia Foundation survey indicates that security trends have a predominantly localized dimension – a finding which this study corroborates. While in Ghazni province 98% of respondents and 94% in Khost indicate that security has gotten worse, the majority of respondents in Balkh (62%) believe that their security situation has not changed over the past two years. Clearly,

<sup>14</sup> "Afghanistan in 2008. A Survey of the Afghan People", Asia Foundation, 2008.

<sup>15</sup> "Combat Poverty to end Insecurity: Afghan Perceptions of Security", Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, 2008.

security dynamics differ from province to province. The table below highlights some of the provincial differences found in the present survey.

Changes in the security situation over the past two years (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Improved	3	9	1	0	11	1	1	0	3
Unchanged	26	34	62	1	44	5	11	25	25
Deteriorated	70	56	37	98	45	94	88	75	70
Other	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
(N)	1015/1020	128/128	143/143	130/131	111/111	128/128	122/124	129/130	124/125

Table 4.1.1 indicate the responses of people interviewed in the field assessment when asked how they believe the security situation has changed over the past two years (2006-2008).

## 4.2 Nature of insecurity

Even between those provinces where respondents offered a consistent perspective on the *degree* to which security has deteriorated, improved, or stayed the same, no commonality can be assumed regarding the *nature* of the insecurity to which they were referring. Findings from this assessment strongly indicate that the causes of insecurity vary greatly not just from province to province, but in fact from district to district. While many or most of the same factors are present across the majority of regions, their levels of comparative influence are not universal.

In each district respondents were asked what they considered to be the most significant causes of insecurity in their community. The survey-wide average of their responses reveals that the armed opposition (83%) and criminal groups (45%)<sup>16</sup> are the most prevalent factors overall. Interesting as that may be, these statistics are not particularly helpful until they are disaggregated further.

In 6 out of 8 provinces (Balkh, Ghazni, Kapisa, Kunar, Logar and Wardak), in those instances where the attacker has been identified, the armed opposition is seen as the main cause of insecurity; although in Herat, Balkh, Logar and Wardak there are more instances where the attacker is *not* known. In the remaining two provinces (Herat and Khost), criminal groups are considered the principal perpetrators. But even in those cases where one group emerged as the clear dominant influence, rarely was it considered the sole cause of local problems. “The government opposition has become very strong and smugglers and criminal groups are present in the area. This is causing insecurity in our community”, said one student in Wardak.

To a much larger extent than in other provinces, a total of 81% of respondents in Kapisa indicated that internal conflicts are an important reason for insecurity (survey-wide average: 21%). Additionally, in Kapisa the local commander is suggested to have much more of a destabilizing influence than elsewhere (45% compared to the survey-wide average of 9%). In general, Kapisan respondents, as well as respondents in Herat, indicate that threats are multiple: internal village conflicts, armed opposition, local commanders and criminal groups are all considered threats by a substantial number of people.

In Ghazni, unlike most other survey areas, the police are seen as a cause of insecurity rather than a neutral or stabilizing factor. Sixty one percent of respondents in Ghazni identified the police as one of the main reasons for general insecurity (the survey-wide average is 7%). At 17%, police in Wardak are also mentioned more frequently as a destabilizing influence compared to other study sites.

<sup>16</sup> Respondents had the opportunity to provide multiple answers. Thus, percentages have been calculated on the basis of the number of answers against each option in relation to the total number of respondents.

Across the board, respondents rarely reported the national army as a cause of insecurity. Only 2% of people mentioned the army when responding to this question.


Insecurity is also linked to the weak presence of the government in some areas, according to a number of respondents. A respondent in Balkh said that the insecurity is caused by “the existence of armed groups and the weakness of the government”. Likewise, a respondent in Ghazni said, “the government’s lack of consideration of people’s needs cause the people to turn against the government”. Similarly, a Kapisan shura member said that: “unemployment is the only reason for insecurity”.

The operations of international forces were seen by a few as a generally destabilizing issue – a topic that was predominantly raised in focus groups. “Conflicts between the opposition and international forces are the main cause of insecurity”, said a principal in Kunar. For others, “bombardments of the international forces is the main problem”, as was suggested by a second principal in Kunar. “The existence of coalition forces and their constant checking of houses, the existence of the opposition and joblessness of the people”, are according to *shura* members in Kunar notable reasons for insecurity in their community.

**“Unemployment is the only reason for insecurity”**  
*Kapisa shura member*

An additional factor that was brought up through the field study was cross-border activities. In boarder areas such as Kunar and Herat, smuggling and other cross-boarder activities are seen as causes of insecurity.

Diagrams 4.2.1 show where communities believe the main sources and causes of insecurity originate



### 4.3 Threats to education within the broader security context

According to survey results, specific threats to the education sector are mainly seen to originate outside the community. Seventy five percent of respondents indicate that threats come from strangers, while only 31% say that the threat comes from known elements within the community. “The strangers are against education in Afghanistan, particularly girls’ education”, said a parent in Balkh. Internal threats were raised as an issue in all provinces, although they were more pronounced in Ghazni, Herat and Logar.




Diagram 4.3.1 indicates whether communities believe threats to emanate from inside or outside the community. Multiple answers were allowed.

A certain margin of error must be permitted when considering the high response rate of those interviewees who indicated that threats to education originate from outside their home community. It is logical that some respondents would answer thus if they felt concerned about repercussions from inside the community should they respond otherwise (including those who genuinely don’t know one way or the other). To ascertain if people interviewed in groups felt social pressure to respond in a certain way when considering if threats were external or internal, the answers from the individual interviews were triangulated with the focus group average. Perhaps surprisingly, individual respondents were *less* inclined to answer that threats were internal than they were in a group setting. This suggests that answers were not affected by people’s fear to admit that threats are internal in front of their peers, although it doesn’t eliminate the social pressure variable altogether.

### 4.4 Attacks on Education – Internal or External?

According to Human Rights Watch’s 2006 report “Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan” three different groups are responsible for attacks: 1) the armed opposition; 2) regional warlords and militia commanders not loyal to the central government; and 3) criminal groups, mostly involved in the narcotics trade.<sup>17</sup> The findings of this field assessment largely support this conclusion.

<sup>17</sup> “Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan”, Human Rights Watch, Volume 18, Number 6 (c), July 2006, p. 4.



The average of survey responses tells us that the majority of external threats and attacks to education come from the armed opposition (42%) and criminal gangs (39%). (Local commanders were mentioned less frequently, but survey location differences must also be borne in mind when comparing the two reports.) The armed opposition is indicated by most respondents as a threat to the education sector in Ghazni and Kunar. In Kapisa and Khost, criminal groups are perceived to be the bigger threat. In Khost, the armed opposition is not perceived to be a threat to the education sector at all. Here, only 1% of respondents consider the armed opposition as a threat to schools, while 100% of respondents indicate criminal groups as a threat. In Wardak, respondents accuse smugglers of having attacked schools. The number of people who said that they do not know where threats are coming from was relatively high for this question. Thirty six percent of those who responded said that they did not know, including a noteworthy 88% in Logar; 62% in Balkh; 61% in Herat; and 60% in Wardak.

Which groups are threatening schools? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Taliban	42	23	21	98	67	1	72	8	32
Criminal Groups	39	30	21	2	80	100	53	7	13
Don't know	36	61	62	2	14	3	19	88	60
Other	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
(N)	855/1020	61/128	135/143	130/131	103/111	120/128	113/124	102/130	87/125

Table 4.4.1 shows where respondents perceive threats to their schools to come from. Multiple answers were possible. Source: field assessment.

As when questioning insecurity in the broader community, in order to establish the authenticity of these responses and seek to reduce the risk that the results are driven by the fear of indicating one response over others, we compared individual response rates to the focus group average. There is no major difference. In focus group discussions, 37% indicated the armed opposition as being the primary threat, and 35% indicated criminal groups.

There is however, another element that could shape how we interpret this response rate. The separation of criminal groups from the armed opposition when it comes to perceived threats can sometimes be difficult. Some activities (kidnappings, for instance), are often carried out by criminal groups who work on commission for anti-government elements. Establishing the true nature of any particular threat is therefore difficult.

Some respondents were more general when asked where the threats against education are coming from. According to a principal in Kunar: “the enemies of knowledge and culture do not want people to be literate”. Interference of foreigners is also a common perceived threat in many boarder areas. “Foreigners, enemies of Afghanistan’s development, are the main threat”, says a police officer in Khost. Moreover, desperation and poverty are mentioned as reasons for attacks. “The school was attacked by illiterate and jobless people due to personal enmity”, says a MoE district officer in Wardak.

#### 4.5 Attacks against Girls vs. Boys Education – Internal or External?

Afghans and outsiders alike acknowledge the presence of a certain cultural resistance towards girls’ education in Afghanistan, although its existence is by no means universal. Attitudes towards girls’ education varies greatly among groups within the country, be they defined by geography, ethnicity, religion, or other factors. It was therefore interesting to assess the degree to which threats to girls’ and boys’ schools were perceived to originate from inside or outside the community, and how that varied across the survey area.

The question of whether there was any correlation between the origin of the attack (internal vs. external) and the target of the attack (girls vs. boys) was determined through a sub-set analysis of the survey answers given by respondents linked specifically to single-sex schools. Results suggest that there are indeed differences. The percentage of respondents who indicated that threats are internal to communities is higher amongst those who are linked to girls' schools than boys' schools. The number of interviewees linked to girls' schools who indicated a prevalence of external threats was a noteworthy 20% less than the survey-wide average.

Research findings further suggest that criminal groups are perceived as much less of a threat to girls' schools than to boys' schools. Only 14% of respondents specifically linked to girls' schools indicated a belief that threats came from criminal groups. This finding must be tempered, however, by the survey-wide average of 41% of respondents linked to girls' schools who said that they did not know where the threat came from.




Diagram 4.5.1 depicts what kind of external threats are perceived by respondents linked to boys' or girls' schools. The sub-set the analysis was conducted on consisted of interviewees that could be linked to a specific school, namely: students, teachers, principals, parents and shura members. Respondents had multiple response options. Source: field assessment.

## 5 NATURE OF ATTACKS

In this chapter a presentation of how attacks on the education system have manifested across the country over the course of the last 3 years will be given, according to their number, their location, their target, their type, their timing, and their possible objective.

### 5.1 How many attacks have taken place?

Between January 2006 and December 2008, 1153 attacks or threats towards the education sector in Afghanistan were reported. The number of attacks started increasing in late 2005<sup>18</sup> and while the frequency remained stable between 2006 and 2007, it almost tripled in 2008. Although a certain margin of error must be accepted as a result of the switch of database used in the assessment (from the UNICEF database for 2006-2007, to the MoE database for 2008), a general consensus supports the assertion that the increase is not unreflective of the level of jump in attacks over that period.





Diagram 5.1.1. shows the total number of reported of attacks per year for the period 2006-2008. The numbers from 2006 and 2007 are based on the UNICEF database (reported incidents), while the figure for 2008 is the official number of attacks given by the Ministry of Education.

### 5.2 Where?

According to the databases accessed, the phenomenon of attacks on schools is not confined to one region of the country in particular, although certainly the most badly affected areas are concentrated in the south and east. The hardest hit provinces over the period in question are Kunar (95 attacks), Khost (91), Nangarhar (74), and Helmand (72). While the total number of attacks in Kabul province (72) matches that of Helmand, due to the density of schools per capita in Kabul, the rate of attack is considered to be quite a bit less.

18 "Lessons in Terror: Attacks on Education in Afghanistan", Human Rights Watch, Volume 18, Number 6 (c), July 2006, p. 4.



Map 5.2.1 indicates which provinces were hardest hit in terms of attacks between 2006 and 2008. For 2006 and 2007, the number used is from the UNICEF database of reported incidents. For 2008, the numbers are the official number of attacks from the Ministry of Education.

The number of attacks in each province has varied throughout the period. While in 2006, the provinces that reported the most attacks were Helmand, Khost, Kandahar and Ghazni; in 2007 they were Khost, Kunar, Herat and Wardak. In 2008, Kunar, Kabul, Nangarhar and Khost were the hardest hit.

Provinces such as Kunar and Khost have remained within the ten most affected provinces throughout the three years in question. Helmand and Kandahar, which figured amongst that group in 2006, disappeared from in 2007 to reappear in 2008. Balkh and Paktika, which were both heavily hit during 2006 and 2007, experienced a reduction in 2008. Kabul, a province which had experienced a relatively low number of attacks in 2006 and 2007, became the second most frequently attacked province in 2008. Very few provinces have seen a decrease in attacks throughout the period. Zabul and Ghor are the only two provinces that have seen a constant reduction between 2006 and 2008. A very few provinces, such as Uruzgan and Laghman, experienced less attacks in 2008 than in 2006. Certain provinces that were relatively calm in 2006 and 2007, like Parwan, Kunduz, Jawzjan, Farah and Baghlan, reported a significant increase in attacks in 2008.

The table below illustrates how education attack trends have changed throughout the period, with provinces grouped according to the degree of change they've experienced. All statistics indicate new incidents and do not account for the accumulated number of schools that were closed over the same time period.

Province	2006	2007	2008	rate of change in 3 years
Bamyan	1	0	1	→
Panjshir	1	1	0	
Daikundi	3	1	2	
Ghor	3	3	2	
Uruzgan	2	5	1	
Badakhshan	5	1	3	→
Samangan	1	2	6	
Nuristan	1	2	8	
Takhar	1	2	8	
Zabul	8	3	1	
Sari Pul	4	5	5	↗
Jawzjan	3	3	14	
Faryab	3	3	16	
Nimroz	0	4	18	
Kapisa	7	3	13	
Baghlan	1	6	19	↗
Laghman	12	4	10	
Parwan	2	6	19	
Badghis	4	9	18	
Farah	7	7	17	
Balkh	14	11	14	↗
Paktia	4	15	21	
Wardak	8	16	17	
Herat	10	17	15	
Ghazni	16	4	24	
Kunduz	6	6	37	↗
Paktika	11	11	32	
Logar	10	13	35	
Kandahar	19	9	34	
Helmand	26	9	37	
Kabul	5	10	57	↗
Nangarhar	9	9	56	
Khost	22	22	47	
Kunar	12	20	63	

Table 5.2.1 shows the number of attacks recorded per province in 2006, 2007 and 2008. The numbers from 2006 and 2007 are based on the numbers of incidents reported and contained in the UNICEF database, while 2008 are the official numbers from the Ministry of Education.

Why do such trend fluctuations exist? There are a number of possible reasons. First, there may be a relation to the ebb and flow of the broader conflict in Afghanistan as it manifests itself in individual provinces. In those cases where attacks are linked to the armed insurgency, one could expect there to be fewer incidents during those times when there is less of a presence of armed insurgents in the area (and *vice versa*), or when the resources or priorities of the insurgents change.

A second aspect that could influence the frequency of attacks is the prevalence of school closure. At the end of June, 2009, a total of 695 schools were reported closed across the country. Helmand, Kandahar, and Zabul, located side-by-side along the border with Pakistan, reported the highest number of closed schools. The Ministry of Education is making a concerted effort to re-open schools and keep education

alive even in those areas where school attacks are at its worst<sup>19</sup>. But many of these re-opened schools are subsequently attacked and shut down again. In Helmand province, for example, 180 schools, or 71% of the total, were inactive from March to July, 2009, but 100 schools were re-opened over the same period. In many of these areas there appears to be an endless, and costly, process of attack, closure, rehabilitation, opening, and attack.

<b>Provinces with the highest number of closed schools as of June '09</b>	<b>Schools Closed</b>	<b>Schools Re-Opened</b>
Helmand	176	100
Kandahar	175	36
Zabul	147	14
Uruzgan	57	47
Paktika	44	2

Table 5.2.2 shows the number of closed schools per province according to the Ministry of Education in June 2009, and how many were reopened in the same period.

As indicated in the tables above, some provinces reporting a decrease or only moderate increase in attacks (such as Zabul and Uruzgan), figure amongst those provinces with the highest number of closed schools. This suggests that if a school is closed it may be less likely to be attacked. While important to bear this possibility in mind, statistically across the country the association between the rates of attack vs. permanent school closure is in fact quite variable and thus such a conclusion should not be considered universally valid.

### 5.3 What is attacked?

While the majority of schools in Afghanistan are either run or directly supported by the Ministry of Education, the contribution of non-state actors is far from insignificant. Since the 1970s, aid agencies have played a central role in providing primary and secondary education in addition to literacy classes, vocational training and teacher training programs in Afghanistan, which normally take place in community- or home-based classes as opposed to the traditional schoolhouse structures commonly adopted by the MoE. The main international aid agencies involved in the education sector in the country are Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), BRAC, CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Save the Children Alliance Sweden-Norway, Swedish Committee for Afghanistan and UNICEF.

According to the Ministry of Education more than 300,000 students are supported through government-sponsored community schools, divided into 4,021 classes<sup>20</sup>. The Ministry has also established almost three times as many regular government schools, totaling 10,714 according to April 2009 MoE figures. A more recent addition to the Afghan education system is a series of private schools what have emerged mainly in urban areas.

Data from UNICEF and MoE databases concur that from these three basic categories of schooling (government, NGO-based, and private), government schools are by far the most targeted. Unfortunately, within the national databases detailing government school attacks no distinction is made between attacks on traditional schoolhouses versus CBE classrooms. Thus it is difficult to determine whether these models are treated differently by attackers to any noteworthy degree. As this could provide important

<sup>19</sup> According to the MoE EQUIP project database, school construction continues also in areas where security threatens construction companies.

<sup>20</sup> Ministry of Education, April 2009.

insight into possible risk mitigation options, the MoE should look into adding information on the type of school to their database.

Community based schools supported by aid agencies have also had their teachers threatened and have been forced to close, but significantly, only one physical attack has been reported.<sup>21</sup> That said, there have been suspensions or modifications of aid agencies' education projects on quite a substantial scale<sup>22</sup>. This might be a preventative measure that the Ministry of Education is less able or willing to undertake and which could possibly have an impact on the difference between their respective attack rates. One suggested hypothesis is that attacks on NGO schools might be reported less than attacks on government schools because the former is not necessarily linked up to an official monitoring system. However, while the reporting rates may be a factor, it likely isn't entirely responsible for the remarkable difference in statistics given that threats to NGO schools *do* seem to be reported with a certain regularity. For all of these reasons, for the purposes of this study it will be assumed that the physical attack rate to NGO schools is less.

Are NGO-supported classes less frequently attacked simply because they aren't governmental, or because of their generally unconventional (and therefore less-identifiable) physical structure? This cannot be answered without considering the ratio of attacks on all community based schools versus regular schools nation-wide. Across the country there are approximately three regular MoE schools for every community based class; however, so long as there is no specific breakdown of attacks on government schools by type, this analysis will not be possible.

**“NGOs are impartial with regard to political issues and simply deal with the people”**  
*Shura member, Wardak*

Interestingly, the general perception of survey respondents does not concur with database statistics. Most respondents believed that there is in fact no difference in how attackers treat government versus NGO schools. Nonetheless, on the basis of the clear difference in attack rates as recorded in the nation-wide databases, respondents were asked why NGOs *could* be less targeted. They came up with a series of possible reasons.

A commonly-cited possibility concurs with the abovementioned hypothesis that classes run by non-governmental organizations are normally home-based, thus there is no individual school building to attack. Likewise, these are less visible to attackers.

Second, it was thought that as NGO schools are not run by the state they may be spared by those attackers whose primary motive is to attack the government. “NGOs are impartial with regard to political issues and simply deal with the people”, said one *shura* member in Wardak. This theory, however, must be balanced by the significant increase in attacks on aid workers in Afghanistan as reported over the past 3 years<sup>23</sup>.

Third, it was suggested that schools supported by NGOs might have security regimes that are stricter than ministry schools. Aid agencies might be quicker or more able to suspend activities when threatened.

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21 One incident of a killing of a teacher in a school supported by the Norwegian Refugee Council has been reported.

22 For instance, the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan had to suspend at least four Community Based Education (CBE) schools in Yahya Khail district of Paktika Province during the first quarter of 2008. Likewise, CARE Afghanistan's CBE program runs with limited activities in approximately half of its operating districts (August 2008).

<sup>23</sup> Overseas Development Institute. “Providing Aid in Insecure Environments: 2009 Update”. April 2009. [http://www.cic.nyu.edu/Lead%20Page%20PDF/HPG\\_2009%20.pdf](http://www.cic.nyu.edu/Lead%20Page%20PDF/HPG_2009%20.pdf)

Fourth, the perceived higher degree of community participation in the community based model that NGOs use might be a factor in preventing attacks. (This will be reviewed in the prevention chapter of this report in greater detail, and again, is a hypothesis that must be balanced by the high percentage of survey responses indicating that attacks and threats originate from outside the community or from unknown sources.)

#### **5.4 Types of attacks**

An interesting variation occurs when one compares the information stored in the UNICEF and MoE databases to the information collated in the field survey. According to the UNICEF database (depicted in the pie chart below), physical attacks outnumber threats by a factor of over 5:1.




Diagram 5.4.1 shows the total number of the various types of incidents between 2006 and May 2008 according to the UNICEF database. The classification has been done by the researcher, based on the explanation of the various incidents contained in the database. UNICEF in its original database just distinguishes between: arson, explosion, death, injury and threat.

According to the field survey results, however, threats – be they in the form of verbal or written intimidation – are ranked as the second and third most common kind of incident inflicted against the education sector, with a significantly reduced margin between threats and the most common kind of incident: arson.






Diagram 5.4.2 illustrates what respondents in the field assessment reported were the major types of incidents incurred against on the education sector. Multiple answers were allowed. Source: field assessment. N=659.

The fact that the number of threats is relatively low in the UNICEF and MoE databases could be explained by an under-reporting of such incidents compared to physical attacks on buildings or personnel. It also could have a lot to do with where the survey took place – due to security reasons, field research was impossible to conduct in those areas where the present-day conflict in the country is at its fiercest; had the survey been undertaken towards the south and east of Afghanistan, the threat/attack ratio might have been different. A more detailed review of threats and physical attacks and threats is offered below.

## 5.5 Threats

According to the UNICEF database, 84 threats in the form of night letters and verbal intimidation were directed towards education staff or students between 2006 and May 2008. It is safe to assume that these numbers are incomplete, as survey results suggest that threats regularly go unreported.

According to the field survey, night letters aimed at the community in general or specific groups of people (39%), face to face verbal intimidation (19%) and written personal intimidation (17%) are the most commonly reported types of threats.




Diagram 5.5.1 depicts the types of threats received or observed by respondents in the field assessment. Respondents had multiple options. Source: field assessment. N= 690.

### 5.6 Who gets threatened?

Out of the total number of survey respondents working in the education sector, 21% admit to having received threats. Khost is by far the most badly affected province in this sense; there, no less than 59% of education personnel claim receiving threats in the past. Education personnel in Wardak, at 38%, are the second most frequent recipients. Fewer threats seem to be made in Balkh and Logar; at respectively 9% and 8%. Why Ghazni is not high on this list given the percentage of respondents claiming threats as the main issue could be explained in a number of ways. It could be linked to the fear of education personnel to admit that they had been threatened, or it could be that the education personnel were not the target of threats, but rather the community in general.




Diagram 5.6.1 outlines how education personnel responded when asked if they had personally received threats. Source: field assessment. N=352/1020. Many respondents chose not to answer.

Threats are also directed towards students. One incident from Logar reported in the UNICEF database related an incident in which two men on motorbikes threatened girls on their way to school. The girls were told to stop attending classes or face the same fate as two other girls in the area who had been killed on their way to school.

## 5.7 Physical Attacks

“The students were attacked from a check point on the way home from school. Two students were killed”, said one pupil in Wardak.

The perpetrators of physical attacks have used various methods to spread fear and destruction in schools across Afghanistan. Again looking to the national picture, the UNICEF database records the following incidents between 2006 and May 2008: 123 explosions in or near schools buildings (including the throwing of grenades, mines and rocket attacks); 254 incidents of arson where school buildings, tents or school material was burned; 64 direct attacks against students or education personnel; 5 incidents of looting; and 24 incidents of a different nature (this category includes breaking and entering, the use of firearms against schools, and cases where school buildings have been damaged in armed fighting). These numbers are not necessarily complete.

Both the UNICEF database and the field assessment show that the nature of physical attacks varies from province to province. According to the incidents reported by UNICEF, arson on schools and inventory is the most common form of physical attack in most provinces. Paktia stands out as the exception with no arson attacks recorded, but exhibits a prevalence of attacks on personnel or students (8) and explosions (9). Explosions are also common in Herat, Khost and Kunar. Attacks on personnel and students are more prominent in Paktia, Helmand, Paktika and Khost.

Type of attack per province 2006-May 2008						
	Burning of building or inventory	Attack on personnel or students	Explosion in or near school	Verbal or oral threat	Looting of inventory	Other attack
BADAKHSHAN	4	1	1	0	0	0
BADGHIS	6	4	0	7	1	1
BAGHLAN	3	1	3	1	0	0
BALKH	13	1	9	4	0	0
BAMYAN	0	0	0	0	0	0
DAI KUNDI	2	0	0	2	0	0
FARAH	14	1	0	4	0	0
FARYAB	3	1	1	1	0	0
GHAZNI	9	2	1	10	0	0
GHOR	7	0	0	0	1	0
HELMAND	26	6	0	5	0	1
HERAT	5	2	16	4	0	0
JAWZJAN	2	3	1	0	0	0
KABUL	3	1	5	2	0	4
KANDAHAR	20	3	7	5	0	0
KAPISA	6	0	4	1	0	0
KHOST	22	5	18	4	2	2
KUNAR	19	2	10	2	0	2
KUNDUZ	9	3	2	2	0	0
LAGHMAN	11	0	4	2	0	0
LOGAR	14	2	7	3	0	2
NANGARHAR	3	0	8	4	1	4
NIMROZ	0	2	1	1	0	1
NURISTAN	4	0	1	1	0	0
PAKTIKA	14	5	3	5	0	0
PAKTIA	0	8	9	3	0	2
PANJ SHIR	0	0	2	0	0	0
PARWAN	5	0	4	1	0	0
SAMANGAN	1	2	0	1	0	0
SARI PUL	6	0	0	2	0	2
TAKHAR	2	0	1	1	0	1
URUZGAN	5	1	0	1	0	0
WARDAK	12	4	5	4	0	0
ZABUL	4	4	0	1	0	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>254</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>24</b>

Table 5.7.1 shows the variations in type of attacks across Afghanistan's provinces. The classification of the attacks was done by the author of this report, based on the incident reports. The UNICEF database's original classification mixes attacks and results of attacks (injuries and deaths are included) and only distinguishes between threats, explosions and arson.

The UNICEF database reveals that across all provinces, attacks on physical structures, not people, are the most common. Arson predominates; according to the UNICEF database, students themselves have even been persuaded to set the schools on fire in some cases. Explosions take second place: grenades have been thrown through school windows, mines placed in school walls and rockets fired at schools. These kinds of reports are backed up by respondents in the field study. "The attackers poured petrol on the tents and set them on fire to bring damage to the school", said a principal in Balkh. Direct attacks on personnel and students are fourth (after threats).

Regardless, teachers and education personnel have suffered enormously from physical attacks: they have been beaten; there have been reports of decapitation; their houses have been set on fire. In other cases, students have been the main target: over 100 students have been killed over the two and a half year period in question.

The author of the present report classified events differently from what had been done in the UNICEF database. The original data only contains the following categories: arson, explosion, death, injury and threat. In other words, incidents (explosions, burnings and threats) are mixed with the results of attacks (death and injuries). This has led to an over-reporting of the number incidents, since an explosion causing the death of 15 people would have been counted as 1 explosion and 15 deaths; resulting in 16 incidents. Moreover, attacks that have not led to injuries or death are often classified as threats. Even kidnappings and the rape of a second grade student figure among the threats. Another problem that arises in the database and decreases its accuracy is the inclusion of incidents that cannot be considered attacks; such as a fire in a school caused by accident. The classification used in this report could be a model to follow in the future keeping of databases since it clearly shows more kinds of attacks and separates these completely from the results of the attacks.

Information regarding physical attacks as collected through the field assessment concurs with the database findings in some ways, and differs in others. First, armed attacks figure as much more of a problem in the field assessment than in the UNICEF database. It is important to highlight that since armed attack is not a category in the database, there could be some under-reporting of such attacks. However, very few incident reports actually highlight this form of attack. In the classification done by the author, armed attacks are contained in the "other" category. It also must be remembered that the survey was conducted in only a few moderately secure provinces, and findings there cannot accurately represent the whole of the country, including the more conflict-prone provinces in the south and east.

Most Damaging Attacks (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
<b>Murder</b>	10	9	1	8	23	4	22	24	9
<b>Terror</b>	3	1	1	0	5	2	8	6	3
<b>Kidnapping</b>	4	4	0	4	8	3	14	0	3
<b>Armed attack</b>	22	6	32	3	59	35	21	30	16
<b>Explosion</b>	22	68	23	10	8	17	17	21	11
<b>Arson</b>	38	13	31	16	62	41	67	48	60
<b>Warning</b>	25	10	10	68	15	39	8	33	8
<b>Night Letter</b>	34	10	14	54	41	53	37	58	25
<b>Other</b>	3	9	1	0	0	2	0	3	8
<b>(N)</b>	659/1020	82/128	103/143	110/131	39/111	109/128	87/124	33/130	92/125

Table 5.7.2 shows the distribution respondents answers in percentages to what type of attacks had occurred to their school. Multiple answers were allowed. Source: field assessment.

## 5.8 Warnings

Warnings before an attack seem to be quite rare according to the quantitative data amassed through the field assessment. Eighty eight percent of the interviewees said that to their knowledge no warning was received; while 5% indicated a belief that forewarning had been given. The provincial differences are only minor, with Wardak and Ghazni at respectively 13% and 10% reporting that there was a warning prior to the attack. “The school and teachers were warned by night letter and finally the school was burned”, said a student in Wardak. In cases where warnings have been given, the school is normally the one that receives it (26%). Community members and the district governor are indicated frequently.

Did you or anyone else in the community receive a warning prior to the attack? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	5	0	8	10	4	2	3	0	13
No	87	96	86	90	70	97	96	92	74
Don't know	7	4	6	0	25	1	1	8	13
(N)	790/1020	82/128	111/143	117/131	91/111	112/128	90/124	83/130	100/125

Table 5.8.1 shows if respondent believe that a warning was given prior to the attack. Source: field assessment.

A number of interesting cases of warnings were described during the qualitative component of the field study. As mentioned in the previous section, girls’ education are often the content of threats and night letters. A principal in Herat told the following story: “two students were warned in night letters that girls should not attend school. The education department was informed and the person responsible escaped from the district”. In another case in the same province, a girls’ school received threats in a night letter that they should refrain from attending English, computer and tailoring courses.

One student in Ghazni brought up the issue of his school’s affiliation with the federal government. “Those who warned the school said that the teachers should not take government salary and not show respect to government officials. Community elders resolved the issue with the people threatening attacks”. Warnings have also been of criminal nature. In Balkh, a parent told the story about teachers being threatened to give up their salary.

## 5.9 When?

Based on the data available from UNICEF (2006 and 2007) and the Ministry of Education (2008), there is a clear trend of increasing attacks not just year-on-year, but also further into months that had previously been relatively “quiet”, such as the summer season. What remains consistent, as the below diagram indicates, is the persistence of attacks at the beginning of the school year in Quarter II.




Diagram 5.9.1 depicts how frequency of attacks varies throughout the year for the period 2006-2008. Source: UNICEF database for 2006 and 2007, MoE for 2008. The numbers used are the total numbers of incidents reported by the two databases.

According to survey respondents, attacks are normally carried out at night. The databases referenced do not track this aspect, but results from the present research clearly indicate that across the survey area the majority of attacks happen during the night (79%), while only 21% are conducted during the day. This trend is fairly even across all provinces, with Khost (98%) and Logar (97%) experiencing the most pronounced consistency. Herat is the only province where respondents suggest day attacks happen almost as frequently as night attacks.




Diagram 5.9.2 shows the distribution in respondents indicating the time of day of attacks. Source: field assessment. N= 583

Time of day the attacks take place (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Night	78	52	74	74	82	98	75	97	86
Day	21	48	24	25	18	2	25	3	14
(N)	583/1020	77/123	98/143	107/131	34/111	103/123	76/124	29/130	58/125

Table 5.9.1 time of day respondents perceive attacks to occur. Source: field assessment.

## 5.10 Why?

### Attacks on Girls vs. Boys Education

In the incident reports this research referenced, plausible reasons for attacks are only mentioned in some cases. In these instances the most recurrent reason is that the school was frequented by girls. There is a clear perception in Afghanistan that girls' education is more at risk than boys'. This is manifested through popular belief, various pieces of research that have come out over the years, and relatively frequent news reports. According to the UNICEF database, girls' schools make up 40% of attacks, mixed schools 32% and boys' schools 28%.




Diagram 5.10.1 illustrates attacks that could be related to girls', boys' or mixed schools. The gender composition of students in a certain school, the school name (where girls', boys' or mixed school is indicated) as well as incidents were the specific content of threats highlighting either boys' or girls' have been used in the classification. Source: UNICEF database, 2006 to May 2008. N= 130.

On the basis of these statistics alone it is clear that there is an attack trend against girls' schools, but this trend is magnified when one considers the number of actual girls vs. boys vs. mixed schools in existence across the country. In reality, boys schools account for just short of 50% of all schools nation-wide, mixed schools for almost 31%, and girls schools for a mere 19%. **Thus, 19% of schools receive 40% of all attacks – a clear sign that girls' education is deliberately under fire.**

Provinces	Total schools	Mixed	Girls	Boys
Zabul	188	0	5	183
Helmand	263	0	6	257
Kandahar	375	0	16	359
Uruzgan	198	1	21	176
Paktika	323	0	26	297
Khost	224	0	41	183
Paktia	243	3	35	205
Nimroz	91	61	7	23
Badghis	371	33	74	264
Ghazni	532	220	89	223
Farah	256	0	43	213
Faryab	405	0	115	290
Bamyan	303	155	71	77
Badakhshan	569	411	97	61
Baghlan	386	72	132	182
Balkh	447	294	51	102
Parwan	348	1	129	218
Panjshir	88	26	29	33
Takhar	417	215	71	131
Juzjan	273	0	78	195
Daykundi	302	0	83	219
Sare pul	319	110	90	119
Samangan	220	86	41	93
Kabul city	204	99	52	53
Ghor	599	283	109	207
Kabul	253	30	52	171
Kapisa	193	1	76	116
Kunduz	372	147	93	132
Kunar	318	168	60	90
Laghman	222	70	63	89
Lugar	219	6	61	152
Nangarhar	481	224	89	168
Nuristan	176	62	44	70
Herat	615	471	75	69
Wardak	330	185	42	103
<b>Total</b>	<b>11123</b>	<b>3434</b>	<b>2166</b>	<b>5523</b>
<b>Overall percentage:</b>		<b>31%</b>	<b>19%</b>	<b>50%</b>

Table 5.10.1 indicates the overall number of MoE schools both active and inactive currently registered across Afghanistan. Source: Ministry of Education, August 2009



The field assessment asked respondents for their opinion on the reason for attacks on schools. Only a very few respondents gave responses to these open ended questions,<sup>24</sup> but those who did quite often, but not always, linked the attacks to girls' education. "The [armed opposition] doesn't want girls to go to school and benefit from education", said a teacher Ghazni. "The boys and girls were studying in one school, but in different classes. Therefore the school was threatened through night letters and then attacked", said another respondent. Respondents in Logar were particularly concerned about girls' education. Interestingly, in Herat not only was the armed opposition seen as an opponent to girls attending school, but criminal groups were also cited in this regard several times. The widespread belief that criminal groups commonly work on commission for the armed insurgency may go some way to explaining this finding.

**Reducing the attack on education phenomenon to an attack against the education of girls would be too simplistic**

Despite this alarming evidence, it is clear that reducing the attack on education to an attack against the education of girls would be too simplistic. As the data indicates, there are several cases where the attacked school has been an all-boys school; even a madrasa has been attacked. Correspondingly, many respondents across the country indicate that the reason for attacks is related to a general hostility towards education, not just as it relates to girls.

"There are enemies of knowledge and culture in Afghanistan", said one *shura* member in Kunar. "It is because the opposition is against education", said a teacher in the same province.

In the databases additional reasons for attacks can be identified: the engagement of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs); the teaching of anti-Islamic curriculum; internal or tribal disputes; and, most significantly, the fact that the school is (rightly or wrongly) perceived to be an entity of the Afghan Government.

One incident report claims: "After a visit of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to a girls' school, the Mullah spread rumors that the students played music and danced in the school while PRT filmed and took pictures inside school compound. The rumors led to a violent demonstration in the district. Demonstrators attacked the district manger's house, breaking several windows and attacking the district judge".<sup>25</sup> According to a field assessment respondent from the Ministry of Education in Logar, PRT funded schools and girls' schools are the most vulnerable in terms of attacks. Another respondent in the same province told the data collection team: "schools become vulnerable after the Americans visit the school".

A related issue – albeit one for which less information is available – could be how schools are funded. A surprising 97% of respondents claimed knowledge about the donor for their school. The provincial variance was limited: Herat, the province with the least informed respondents, still had a 90% response rate. In Kunar, Ghazni and Logar all respondents indicated a donor of the school. This does not mean, however, that respondents in the field study were aware of the correct donor. The research process did not verify which donors were active in the communities under study. It is nevertheless not unlikely that communities are well aware of the donors and organizations that implement education projects: according to the Ministry of Education, increasing transparency of education projects is one of the goals of the Parent/Teachers Associations and School Management Committees. The fact that there is such a high level of donor awareness could be relevant for school security; unfortunately, there is too little information available in the current data sets regarding the donor of the attacked schools to draw any conclusions. The inclusion of donor information in future school security databases could help increase our understanding of this issue.

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<sup>24</sup> This was part of the qualitative questions and many did not respond or responded that they did not know.

<sup>25</sup> MoE database.

The concern that attacks on schools relate to the teaching of the “wrong curriculum” has been raised by several stakeholders in the education sector. Incident reports contained in the UNICEF database include threats that highlight “anti-Islamic” curriculum as the reason for the threat. Unfortunately, the field assessment did not reveal any further information on this issue.

**“We have had three explosions at our school due to tribal disputes”**  
- *Principal, Herat*

The field study also revealed that tribal disputes are sometimes considered the reason for an attack. One principal in Herat explained: “we have had 3 explosions at our school due to tribal disputes”. Similarly, a teacher in Kunar stated: “due to internal disputes, the school’s tents were burned.” In Wardak, the rockets launched at two community based girls’ schools are suspected to be because of internal fights amongst families in the district

(UNICEF database). Unfortunately, there is little information on the nature of these conflicts from either the field assessment or the databases.

In Kunar, the blame for certain attacks as cited by field study interviewees was placed across the international border. “Neighboring countries are interfering in order to impede the country’s development and education of the people”, said one teacher in Kunar. Overall conclusions regarding the veracity of these suggestions are difficult to produce since, as previously mentioned, the reason for attacks can rarely be confirmed.

There are several other lesser-cited causes: in Wardak, where fighting along the highway is a security issue, communities participating in the field research saw the location of the school along the same highway as the main reason for it being attacked – i.e., by accident of location. In Balkh, a student mentioned an episode related to poverty and frustration: “the poor local people were not hired by the company which was constructing the school and it caused them to set fire to the tents that were used for classes”. *Shura* members in Kapisa put forward the story about a school being attacked due to the regular police presence inside the school.

But perhaps the single most important reason cited for attacks is the fact that schools are (or are perceived to be) government entities. Although this reason figured less strongly in the field study, statistical findings were clear in the UNICEF and MoE databases, which, importantly, include attacks which have taken place in areas where the conflict is at its worst. “The [armed opposition] is against the government and they are attacking schools in order to remove the relations between the government and the people”, said an NGO worker in Ghazni. Night letters threaten teachers “collaborating” with the Ministry of Education and receiving pay from the government. One Ministry of Education officer in Ghazni recounted: “the night letter said that teachers should stop taking salaries from the government.” Several incidents recorded in the UNICEF database involve attackers breaking into schools only to burn the Afghan flag.

## 6 CONSEQUENCES OF ATTACKS

There is no doubt that attacks on schools, students and teachers have an impact on the access of Afghan children to education which extends well beyond the violence of the event itself. This section of the report examines the extent of that impact through the closure of schools and resultant lost school days, the damage to school property and goods, and the consequences an event – or the fear of potential events – has on overall school attendance.

### 6.1 School Closure & Lost School Days

In the province of Kandahar, the overall security situation is so bad that nearly half of all schools are closed some or all of the time.<sup>26</sup> In 2008, the ongoing insurgency in Kandahar was depriving about 40,000 students of an education, the head of the province's education department said. Only 232 of Kandahar's 370 schools remained open because of the deteriorating security situation in the restive province. According to the official, all the closed schools were located in volatile districts where armed opposition attacks and bombings had prevented schoolchildren and teachers from attending class. Numerous schools had been burned down by militants in the previous few months and armed opposition threats had forced further closures.<sup>27</sup> The number of home based literacy centers in the province has, nevertheless, experienced significant growth over the past years as a response to the increased risk. These services are found mainly in the urban centers.<sup>28</sup>

**652 schools are currently closed due to insecurity, depriving more than 340,000 children the right to education**

Helmand officials report a dramatic drop in children attending school, as a direct consequence of armed opposition attacks targeting the education system. "Compared with just one year ago, the number of children recorded as going to school is tiny", indicates a report from May 2008. According to an official from the Helmand education department, only 35,000 pupils were attending school at the beginning of 2008.<sup>29</sup>

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26 Times online, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article3882980.ece> (accessed June 20th, 2008)

27 Quqnoos, [http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=540&Itemid=48](http://quqnoos.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=540&Itemid=48) (May 5th, 2008)

28 According to UNICEF representative, February 2009.

29 Cited in Institute for war and peace, Helmand (ARR No. 289, 13-May-08)




Diagram 6.1.1 shows the distribution of closed schools across 10 provinces in June 2009 according to the Ministry of Education.

In the south-eastern province of Zabul, approximately 80% of schools were reported closed in 2008 due to a lack of security. An estimated 35,000 children were missing lessons as a result of these closures. Pupils and teachers in Zabul said they had been warned not to attend school by insurgents and other armed groups.<sup>30</sup> Zabul is in fact one of the few provinces where attacks on schools have decreased over the past years; this decrease is likely to have been caused by the elevated number of closed schools.

The National Education Strategic Plan indicates that 6% of schools were burned or closed down from October 2005 to March 2007. According to the Ministry of Education, 695 schools across the country were closed as of June 2009, affecting over 340,000 students.<sup>31</sup>

The total numbers of existing schools and the degree of school closure by province is indicated in the table below.

Provinces	Total schools	Total Mixed Schools	Total Girls Schools	Total Boys Schools	Inactive	% of inactive schools
Zabul	188	0	5	183	152	81
Helmand	263	0	6	257	180	68
Kandahar	375	0	16	359	174	46
Uruzgan	198	1	21	176	58	29
Paktika	323	0	26	297	46	14
Khost	224	0	41	183	14	6
Paktia	243	3	35	205	15	6
Nimroz	91	61	7	23	5	5
Badghis	371	33	74	264	17	5
Ghazni	532	220	89	223	18	3
Farah	256	0	43	213	8	3

30 UK BBC News, 25 June 2008 18:11

31 According to the MoE security database, accessed August 2009.

Faryab	405	0	115	290	8	2
Bamyan	303	155	71	77	0	0
Badakhshan	569	411	97	61	0	0
Baghlan	386	72	132	182	0	0
Balkh	447	294	51	102	0	0
Parwan	348	1	129	218	0	0
Panjshir	88	26	29	33	0	0
Takhar	417	215	71	131	0	0
Juzjan	273	0	78	195	0	0
Daykundi	302	0	83	219	0	0
Sare pul	319	110	90	119	0	0
Samangan	220	86	41	93	0	0
Kabul city	204	99	52	53	0	0
Ghor	599	283	109	207	0	0
Kabul Province	253	30	52	171	0	0
Kapisa	193	1	76	116	0	0
Kunduz	372	147	93	132	0	0
Kunar	318	168	60	90	0	0
Laghman	222	70	63	89	0	0
Lugar	219	6	61	152	0	0
Nangarhar	481	224	89	168	0	0
Nuristan	176	62	44	70	0	0
Heart	615	471	75	69	0	0
Wardak	330	185	42	103	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>11123</b>	<b>3434</b>	<b>2166</b>	<b>5523</b>	<b>695</b>	<b>6</b>

Table 6.1.1 shows the total number of closed schools in Afghanistan in end December 2008. Source: Ministry of Education, July, 2009.

Despite the security situation some schools resume activities fairly quickly after attacks, remaining closed for just days or weeks. There is no accurate data available to determine the average number of days a school remains closed. Across those provinces studied in the field assessment, schools normally remain closed for between 1 and 3 months (85%). Ghazni stands out as the province where schools remained closed for longer periods of time. It is a safe assumption that these statistics, all taken from provinces where the current conflict is manifested at low or moderate levels, do not reflect the averages of school days lost in highly insecure provinces such as Helmand, Zabul, and Kandahar.

Periods of school closure after an attack (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
1-3 months	85	95	100	82	85	100	92	94	64
4-6 months	14	3	2	39	13	0	8	6	13
7-12 months	2	0	0	3	8	0	0	3	3
More than a year	2	3	0	1	13	0	0	3	0
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
(N)	398/1020	39/128	48/143	93/131	39/111	38/111	36/124	34/130	67/125

Table 6.1.2 shows how long respondents report schools to have been closed after an attack. Source: field assessment.

## 6.2 Lost assets

The field study collected statistics on the damage to educational facilities generated through arson (the most common form of physical attack on school structures). Across the survey area there was a relatively limited number of cases in which the complete destruction of the school building was recorded: only 3% of respondents reported their school to have been left beyond repair. Over 10%, however, reported the destruction of tents which in many instances serve as schoolrooms, so it is likely that the destruction of the primary class structure in fact rests somewhere in-between these two figures. In 10% of cases limited damage was reported, with an additional 3% reporting a destroyed roof – damage which, especially in the harsh Afghan winters, can render a building inhabitable. It must be remembered, however, that in Afghanistan today only 55% of existing schools actually have a physical schoolroom, which clearly skews the perceived significance of building damage and destruction rates. In 10% of cases, inventory was reported destroyed. Even in those instances in which schools re-open in a relatively short amount of time, the loss of school inventory creates assured disadvantages to the educational process.

The level of damage to schools after attacks (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Completely destroyed	10	3	13	6	0	4	30	0	7
Half destroyed	6	7	0	22	10	2	15	0	0
Destroyed the roof	11	0	13	0	17	10	13	21	11
Limited damage	36	77	48	0	60	42	7	95	15
Destroyed inventory	38	3	17	56	67	69	18	68	41
Tent	39	47	24	50	57	44	52	26	27
I don't know	2	3	4	6	0	2	0	0	3
other	15	17	6	6	13	42	13	11	8
(N)	334/1020	30/128	54/143	12/131	30/111	48/128	60/124	19/130	71/125

Table 6.2.1 Damage reported due to arson attacks. Source: field assessment.

## 6.3 Post school-reopening attendance rates / impact of fear

It is a natural reaction from a parent to be more hesitant to send their children to school after the school they go to has been attacked or threatened. But a direct incident on the school is not the only factor that keeps people away. “Each incident affects the risk assessment that parents and students undertake nearly every day. Single episodes, even from far away districts, accumulate to establish a pattern: in a country as traumatized by violence as Afghanistan, teachers, parents, and students are keenly attuned to fluctuations in this pattern and decide to continue or stop their education based on how they view the general climate of insecurity and how it will manifest itself in their immediate environment.”<sup>32</sup>

**“Students are scared when they attend school. They are afraid of kidnappings and explosions”**  
*Principal, Herat*

The 2006 Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) study into the economic, social, and cultural rights of Afghans revealed that 94% of interviewees stated that education facilities were available. However, “this figure masks the reality that only 68.5 percent of interviewees said that their primary school-age children are attending school regularly” - 74% boys and 63% girls.<sup>33</sup> According to the same report by AIHRC, conditions worsened in the 2007 and 2008. Despite close to the same availability of education facilities, there is a decrease in attendance of 8% for boys and 11% for girls. “Again, the decline is arguably linked to increasing insecurity and in particular to threats and attacks

32 Human Rights Watch “Lessons in terror”, 2006, <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11295/section/7>

33 “Insurgent Abuses against Afghan Civilians”, AIHRC, (p. 36)

against schools and families who send their children there”.<sup>34</sup> The consequences of attacks and threats against the education sector are thus graver than the sum total of closed schools due to attacks and threats. It exceeds the horrible loss of human lives. Attacks on schools could potentially eradicate the important results obtained in the education sector.

Results from the field survey corroborate this argument. According to a respondent in Logar, “students and teachers cannot go to school due to the deteriorated security situation”. “Students are scared when they attend school. They are afraid of kidnappings and explosions”, added a principal in Herat.

When interviewees in the field study were asked what changes occur in boys’ and girls’ attendance after an attack or in fear of an attack, girls were cited as the most affected. Thirty six percent of respondents said that the security incident had led to a reduction in girls’ attendance. Twenty seven percent indicated that fewer boys had frequented the school. Similarly, male teachers were said to have decreased their attendance by 3% of respondents, while 7% believed that female teachers attended less. There are also provincial differences, as the table below shows.

Decrease in school attendance following a threat/attack (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Boys	27	1	6	68	6	58	22	11	26
Girls	36	39	41	22	32	46	36	46	31
Male teacher	3	0	0	3	2	8	3	0	4
Female teacher	7	0	3	13	2	1	18	14	6
No changes	43	59	59	11	68	29	49	49	33
(N)	707/1020	69/128	107/143	107/131	81/111	93/128	72/124	76/130	95/125

Table 6.3.1 indicates how respondents perceive attendance of different groups to have changed after a threat or an attack. Source: field assessment.

In those instances where boys’ attendance appears harder hit than girls, such as Ghazni province, it is likely that this is at least in part due to the much higher proportion of boys’ schools to girls operating in the region: in absolute numbers, if fewer girls aren’t in education to begin with, then fewer will be attending less on the basis of fear. But of the girls who *do* attend classes in Ghazni, the *percentage* of those that dropped out is higher than the percentage of boys. Other studies corroborate this. In 2008 the BBC reported the provincial council as having witnessed “a significant decline recently in the number of pupils, especially girls, attending school.”<sup>35</sup>

The 2006 Human Rights Watch’ report “Lessons in Terror”, also clearly indicates that girls are harder hit by the increasing insecurity than boys. “In every respect, girls, who have much more limited access to education to begin with and who are typically the first to be pulled out of school because of insecurity, are disproportionately affected.”<sup>36</sup>

34 Insurgent Abuses against Afghan Civilians”, AIHRC, (p. 36)

35 BBC News, Dec. 12, 2008

36 Human Rights Watch “Lessons in terror”, 2006, <http://www.hrw.org/en/node/11295/section/7>

## 7 COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT IN SCHOOL PROTECTION (DOES IT MAKE A DIFFERENCE?)

Respondents in this assessment clearly see the community as having a critical role in the protection of their schools.<sup>37</sup> In fact, when queried, most respondents indicated the community as the entity they see as holding the *primary* responsibility for school security. As outlined in the graph below, 85% see school protection as a responsibility of the community; 73% indicate the school administration; and another 71% indicate schools guards (the latter two also largely translatable as “community-based”, as the participants in those mechanisms are almost always local). Only 45% of respondents indicate that the responsibility lies with government and 32% indicate the police. Both the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the international military forces are seen as all but irrelevant in this regard.




Diagram 7.1 shows who people believe are responsible for schools security. Respondents had multiple options and could indicate more than one answer. Source: field assessment. N=994.

With the clearer understanding of the nature of threats and attacks on education in Afghanistan as presented in the first section of the report, it becomes possible to turn to the various prevention mechanisms currently in operation across the country and attempt to inspect them through a more nuanced lens. Although a number of state-based protection mechanisms exist, this research focused almost exclusively on the community-based ones, including those such as security *shuras* which are state-sponsored but managed and implemented by community members.

<sup>37</sup> It is important to highlight that a community is not a homogenous group and that hostility towards education is often found within the same community that should protect the school.



## 7.1 School Protection Mechanisms

Before considering the current or potential effectiveness of community engagement in school protection a brief outline of the most common mechanisms in place across the country is presented below.

Community participation in the education sector has mainly been structured through Parent Teacher Associations (PTAs) and School Management Committees (SMCs). The Ministry of Education, as part of their National Education Strategic Plan, declared the establishment of PTAs as mandatory for all MoE schools. Part of this roll-out took place through the Education Quality Improvement Program (EQUIP). A total of 8114 School Management Committees were also established throughout the country.<sup>38</sup> Recently, these two structures merged into School Management *Shuras* designed to oversee both the regular management of the schools as well as how the EQUIP grants are spent. These entities are meant to represent the community and involve it more fully in the establishment and running of education projects.

According to respondents in the field study, mechanisms for community involvement in children’s education are in place across all communities that were assessed. Ninety one percent of respondents stated that there was a PTA or education *shura* at their school. Only 6% claimed there was no such structure. Minor provincial differences exist: Herat, which reported the lowest rate of existing community mechanisms amongst those surveyed, still had such mechanisms according to 70% of the respondents. In the other 7 provinces, more than 80% stated that the mechanisms were in place.

Existence of PTA/Education Shuras in schools (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
PTA	91	70	82	98	100	100	98	98	79
Education Shura	43	0	66	4	86	99	9	43	38
No	6	30	9	1	0	0	0	0	10
Don't know	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	10
Other	1	1	2	0	6	0	0	0	1
(N)	983/1020	122/128	141/143	126/131	108/111	121/128	120/124	130/130	117/125

Table 7.1.1 indicates respondents’ perceptions of the existence of mechanisms for community involvement in their schools in percentages. Source: field assessment.

In addition to these general mechanisms for community participation in school management, the Ministry of Education has established school security *shuras* in 7,195 schools that have experienced attacks across the country.<sup>39</sup> Their establishment is part of a national program initiated by the Ministry of Education in 2006 and led by the Department of Protection and Safety of Schools. Security *shuras* are unarmed and use methods of negotiation to engage with elements that are opposing education in their areas. Particular attention is given to establishing a local acceptance of girls’ education. *Shura* members come from the community itself and can consist of parents or other persons that are interested in the protection of the schools. As explained by a provincial head of the Ministry of Education: “a security *shura* normally consists of between 5-7 members. The students’ parents volunteer their time to solve the problems of attacks on schools. And the government is aware of the structure.” As part of this system, the Ministry of Education also pays for one or two guards to patrol and protect the school, particularly at night.<sup>40</sup> It also happens that on their own initiative community members engage directly in patrolling the school or hire additional guards to do so. There is, however, no clear link between the schools security *shuras* and the new School Management Committees. In order to limit duplication of efforts and ensure coherence in initiatives, this link should be looked at.

<sup>38</sup> Ministry of Education, April 2009.

<sup>39</sup> Ministry of Education, April 2009.

<sup>40</sup> Ministry of Education department in Parwan province.

The Ministry of Education has additionally deployed throughout the country more than 85 Provincial Protection Officers. Their role is multi-fold: they build capacity on school protection for communities in their provinces, they act as a first point of contact for the Protection Division of the MoE, and importantly, they are responsible for collecting information on threats and attacks as they happen and reporting them back to the central team in Kabul.

In Khost, the *Arbikai Shura* (a traditional community defense structure) is often used to prevent attacks. This structure is not a School Security *Shura* established by the MoE, but a traditional structure that deals with security of the community in general. The members of the structure are young men from different tribes in the area in question. They are paid by the community and known by the government.

## 7.2 Community effectiveness in preventing attacks

Despite the high number of community participation mechanisms reported, it cannot be assumed that the mere existence of a mechanism for community participation in itself prevents attacks. In order to establish a true picture of what mechanisms could prevent attacks there is a need for more detailed data about how various mechanisms work (or not) in different contexts: what are the tasks they carry out and to what degree do they engage in proactive prevention work? How effective do they believe themselves to be; how effective does the community perceive them to be? Posing such questions is fundamental to determining how communities can effectively protect their schools and children. The present study did not look into these details, but strongly recommends that such a study be pursued.

Too cursory a glance at the field study results would suggest that there is no difference in the rate of attacks between those schools where mechanisms for community involvement are in place and where they are not. Due to the lack of in-depth information regarding the true effectiveness of these mechanisms in each instance, such findings (as illustrated in the chart below) might be deceptive; the available data is unable to inform the reader about whether the majority of attacked schools had ineffective mechanisms while the majority of un-attacked schools enjoyed effective ones, or whether the average really is truly representative across the board.




Diagram 7.2.1 shows the presence of PTAs or education shuras in schools that have been attacked and not. ‘Yes’ rates indicate where they do exist, and ‘no’ rates indicate where they do not. Source: field assessment. Respondents related to attacked schools N=803; respondents linked to non attacked schools N=141.

What the findings *do* inform us, however, regards the role communities believe they should be playing in the protection of their schools. Responses varied in nature but mostly related to the conduction of negotiations with hostile elements. This teacher from Ghazni summed up the voice of many: “Communities can contact the opposition and negotiate that they do not attack the school.” Similar comments were made with specific reference to girl-specific targeting: “the community must discuss with the [armed insurgents] so that they do not attack girls’ schools”, said one student in Wardak. Community participation in negotiations with hostile elements is clearly seen as a preventive measure by respondents.

Raising awareness in the communities and with the attackers about the importance of education is also seen as a task that communities could carry out. Others said that hiring guards and increasing patrolling is the most appropriate way forward. “Local people must hire guards for the schools until the opposition understands that the schools are for the people and not for the government”, said one student Ghazni. Many respondents highlighted the importance of collaboration between communities, elders, school administration, police and other government officials.

Findings from this study clearly suggest that two factors must be borne in mind when considering the possible effectiveness of these recommended roles. The first is the source of the attack. Second, and highly related, is the existence or lack thereof of channels of communication with attackers.

When the source of the attack is thought to be inside the community, attackers are often known and a channel of communication can feasibly be set up for dialogue. One hundred eleven of the 281 respondents (40%) who indicated threats as internal said that there had been post-attack contact.

Survey results also indicate **that those communities which cite the armed conflict as the main source of threat or attack (as opposed to criminal groups) are more likely to know who the attackers are and how to communicate with them.** Depending on the region and the armed group in question, the insurgents might have a more or less continual community-based or district-based presence, facilitating the establishment of contact. The largest insurgent group in Afghanistan, the Taliban, has extensive representation in the areas under their control, and several courts set up in a number of provinces to deal with civil as well as criminal issues and to adjudicate community grievances. In those areas where the Taliban is operative, it is conceivable that such mechanisms might be used for dialogue.

Across the provinces surveyed, the armed opposition was perceived as the main external source of threat or attack in Ghazni, Kunar and Wardak. These are also the three provinces that report the highest rates of contact between communities and the attackers in the aftermath of an attack. **Notably, respondents who indicated the armed opposition as the only threat are seemingly more able or more inclined to talk to the attackers after an attack, with 50% of this group suggesting that there has been post-attack contact.** It’s an important finding that could be otherwise hidden by the fact that apart from the province of Ghazni, which reported an uncommonly high degree of contact with attackers, most provinces reported a low contact rate overall, with a cross response group average (i.e., combining armed opposition and criminal group answers) of 76% indicating that there has been no contact.

**Where criminal groups are more commonly cited as the main threat – in Khost and Kapisa in particular – the rate of post-attack contact is decisively low.** In Logar, where 88% of respondents suggest that they do not know who the attackers are, the correspondingly low rate of contact is in no way incongruous with that finding.

Which groups are threatening schools? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Taliban	42	23	21	98	67	1	72	8	32
Criminal Groups	39	30	21	2	80	100	53	7	13
Don't know	36	61	62	2	14	3	19	88	60
Other	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
(N)	855/1020	61/128	135/143	130/131	103/111	120/128	113/124	102/130	87/125

Table 7.2.1 shows where respondents perceive threats to come from. Multiple responses were possible. Source: field assessment.




Diagram 7.2.2 shows the provincial differences regarding post attack contact between communities and attackers. Attackers include internal, armed opposition, and criminal groups. Source: field assessment. N= 912.

All interviewees who had not sought contact with their attackers were asked why not. Again, Khost, as the province reportedly dominated by criminal group attacks, stands out. At 96%, a clear majority of respondents indicated that the lack of contact was due to fear: an unambiguous anomaly to the survey-wide response average of 60% amongst all those who reported criminal groups as the only threat. When all fear responses were combined (i.e., fear from any and all sources of attack), Khost stands out even more dramatically, as the survey-wide ‘fear factor’ leveled at a mere 26%. In contrast, **none of the 221 respondents that indicated the armed insurgents as the only threat said that the reason for lack of contact was fear.** This could be a very important finding, with significant implications for the way in which communities are structured and supported to protect schools – a question to be discussed in the concluding section of this report. Equally interesting, and worthy of deeper research, is that of those respondents who said that threats are internal to communities only 7% said that the reason for the lack of contact was fear.

Why has the community not contacted the attackers? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Everyone is scared	26	18	3	16	28	96	2	13	9
They will not meet	15	22	36	28	17	0	4	3	8
No way to contact them	54	47	58	12	55	4	94	76	83
Other	5	16	3	44	0	0	0	8	0
(N)	687/1020	76/128	138/143	25/131	104/111	115/128	85/124	76/130	64/135

Table 7.2.2 show why respondents believe that there has been no contact between the community and attackers after the attack. Source: field assessment.

### 7.3 The importance of community acceptance for education in the prevention of attacks

An interesting association emerged through the field survey between attack rates and the number of communities which had actively requested that a school be built in their area versus those which did not. While 65% of respondents from non-attacked schools said that the community did request the school, only 56% of respondents linked to attacked schools said the same. While the variables assessed are not sufficient to draw strong conclusions, the trend is nonetheless interesting to note. Is it possible that a greater desire to see children attend school is linked to the same community’s ability or dedication to keep local education safe? If this is indeed the case, a wide-reaching education promotion campaign may be yet another important option in the arsenal of methods needed to keep schools safe.




Diagram 7.3.1 shows whether the community requested the school or not, divided between respondents related to schools that have and have not experienced attacks. Source: field assessment. Respondents related to attacked schools N=803; respondents linked to non attacked schools N=141.

### 7.4 Community success in preventing attacks

Logically, while having open lines of communication with attackers is an important step to successful negotiation, it on its own is not enough. As a Ministry of Education officer in Balkh said: “the local people have discussed with the opposition and they have had both positive and negative results”. What’s more, negotiation is not the only way of preventing attacks from taking place. A more overt or more responsive physical presence at the site of the school is another preventative tactic, perhaps more appropriate in those areas where no channels of communication are open between the community and the attackers. Successful cases of both kinds of prevention were cited in the field assessment. Respondents also described successful prevention (or the lack thereof) as divided into two categories: attacks that were prevented entirely, and attacks where the extent of the intended damage was limited thanks to rapid action on the part of the community or the school protection mechanism in place.

Across the field assessment area, the majority of respondents (87%) say that no attacks have been prevented in their communities, while only 4% confirm clear cases of prevention. Regional differences exist, however; both Balkh and Khost report a prevention rate of 12%. Only in Ghazni and Logar were no successful preventions recorded. In Logar, this could make some sense, given the high percentage of respondents who did not know who was perpetrating the attacks, although questions about how their schools are physically protected and why those mechanisms have failed across the board must be asked. On the other end of the spectrum, survey respondents in Ghanzi boasted the highest record of post-attack

contact with attackers amongst all areas studied, which raises different questions. In both cases, a more in-depth review of why no prevention has occurred must be undertaken before conclusions are reached.

Have attacks been prevented in the past? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	4	1	12	0	3	12	5	0	1
No	87	95	87	99	61	87	93	95	82
Don't know	8	4	1	1	36	2	3	5	17
(N)	929/1020	85/128	142/143	129/131	102/111	113/128	111/124	127/130	116/125

Table 7.4.1 shows if respondents believe that attacks have been prevented in the past. Source: field assessment.

Much can be learned from those documented cases where communities have negotiated with potential attackers and have subsequently obtained “permission” to continue teaching. One such case was mentioned by a *shura* in Herat. “At first, the opposition did not permit teaching, but after discussions, they gave their permission to the teachers to carry on teaching”.

In Herat, one police officer described a case in which the police and the community collaborated in the aftermath of an attack. The community arranged to meet with the attackers (in this case, an armed insurgent group) and negotiated a stop in attacks allowing teachers and students to return to school. The police facilitated the meeting with resources for transportation of the community members to the meeting venue. This type of collaboration seems relatively rare across the survey area: very few cases were cited where police and government have been directly involved in prevention.

**“At first, they [the opposition] did not permit teaching; but after discussions, they gave their permission to the teachers to carry on”**

In addition to negotiations, communities have for instance banned strangers into their area. As a more immediate dissuasive measure they sometimes hire night guards or patrol the schools at night themselves. Interviewees told stories about communities reacting to night letters by boosting such patrolling. In other instances, communities have attracted attention to the threat by publicly broadcasting the night letter that they received, and no attack ensued.

**“When the opposition attacked the school and killed one guard, the people attacked them and forced them to flee the area”**

Respondents also described how night guards have prevented schools and tents from burning down after an attack or engaged in firefights with attackers. In other cases, community members themselves have engaged in firefights with the attackers. “When the opposition attacked the school and killed one guard, the people attacked them and forced them to flee the area” said *shura* members in Khost.

Despite these testimonies, the field assessment cannot accurately measure how successful community engagement had been in preventing the threats or attacks in the first place; there are simply too many factors missing to be able to offer a rigorous analysis.

## 7.5 Other prevention mechanisms – what role do they play?

While no association can be presently confirmed or denied between the rate of prevention and the existence or level of functioning of education *shuras* and/or security *shuras*, an association was observed between rate of attacks and the presence of National Solidarity Program (NSP) mechanisms; in particular, the Community Development Councils (CDCs). Almost all respondents linked to schools that have not

been attacked said that such a mechanism existed in their community. In comparison, little more than half of the respondents from attacked schools said the same. This could indicate that other community organization mechanisms not explicitly linked to the school could mitigate the risk of attacks; but it must also be borne in mind that NSP mechanisms are generally strongest where the government’s own presence is strongest, and where the insurgent’s local power is accordingly weakest. This by itself might account for a large part of the observed association.




Diagram 7.5.1 highlights the differences between attacked and non attacked schools in relation to the presence of NSP mechanisms.

Questions about the perception of the involvement of the police in the protection of schools produced some stark contrasts. Respondents were asked specifically whether the vicinity of a police station would increase, have no effect, or decrease the risk of attack. Across the survey area 40% claimed it would help and 40% said it would not help; a further 16% believed it would in fact *increase* the risk. This average, however, masks some crucial provincial differences. Respondents in Herat and Balkh largely believe that the vicinity of a police station would increase school security, returning a favourable response rate of 80% and 86%, respectively. Respondents in Ghazni and Wardak, on the other hand, were extremely skeptical. In Ghazni, no less than 53% of respondents believed that the risk of attacks on the school would worsen if a police station were to be placed close by. Confirming what has been stated in earlier sections of this report, such findings indicate that **risk to school attacks are factors are highly localized in nature, and the preventative measures implemented must respond to those factors instead of following a universal model.**

Would the vicinity of a police check point/office improve school security? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	40	80	86	6	38	21	55	25	6
No	40	13	8	40	44	77	22	68	49
It would make it worse	16	0	1	53	17	1	22	6	29
Don't know	4	8	4	1	0	0	0	1	15
Other	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
(N)	1017/1020	128/128	143/143	131/131	110/111	126/128	121/124	130/130	124/125

Table 7.5.1 shows how people responded when asked if a police station/check point would increase school security. Source: field assessment.

Another risk mitigating method discussed with interviewees in the field assessment was to hire staff from the local community to teach and run the school. Making the school as local an enterprise as possible had been previously discussed by stakeholders as a possible measure to prevent attacks. More than 90% of

respondents indicated that that their schools already had local staff. Eighty nine percent of respondents indicated that they believed hiring local staff has had a positive effect on the security of the school. Fifty one percent reported a considerable positive effect. Only 9% believed the provenience of school staff to be irrelevant. This means that not having local staff is perceived to be a risk by most people interviewed in the field assessment, and could be an important insight when designing risk mitigation strategies.

As shown in the table below, Ghazni province again presents irregularities, standing out as the province with the least faith in hiring locally to prevent attacks. Only 7% of respondents in that province believed that a local hire policy has or would have a significant impact, while 26% thought it would have no impact. On the contrary, the vast majority of respondents in Khost, Kunar and Kapisa (all exceeding 85%) believed that hiring locally has or would have a considerable effect.

Would hiring school staff locally minimize risk of attacks? (by %)									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes, significantly	51	51	62	11	97	98	96	30	52
Somewhat	17	34	34	45	3	2	0	53	16
No, not much	9	10	4	43	0	0	2	15	24
I don't know	2	4	0	1	0	0	0	2	8
(N)	1015/1020	115/128	74/143	80/131	97/111	124/128	110/124	97/130	103/125

Table 7.5.2 outlines if respondents feel that hiring staff locally will mitigate risk of attacks. Source: field assessment.

### 7.6 Community perceptions of what could improve school security

When interviewees in the field assessment were asked what they believed could be done to prevent attacks from amongst the community-based and non-community based mechanisms, 72% cited the establishment of security shuras in schools; 56% believed in general disarmament; 43% in negotiation with the armed opposition; and another 36% in increasing the police’s involvement in protection of schools. International military forces (IMF) were seen to have no role in improving school security: only 1% of respondents chose this option. But again, survey-wide averages are not necessarily the most important indicators: the overall findings from this study suggest very strongly that preferred mechanisms must be determined on a province by province – and possibly district by district – basis. While some mechanisms may have a positive impact in some areas, they may be of much less use in others, and in fact have a detrimental impact in yet other areas. Understanding local differences, and listening to local perceptions of what mechanisms stand the best chance of succeeding, is absolutely vital in protecting schools.




Diagram 7.6.1 depicts the mitigating measures that respondents suggest to decrease the risk of attacks against schools, students and personnel. Multiple answers were allowed, Source: field assessment. N=976.



## 8 CONCLUSION

### 8.1 ANALYSIS OF MAJOR FINDINGS

This study has revealed many things about the nature of attacks, their far reaching consequences, some of the prevention and protection mechanisms currently in place, and what communities feel must be done in order to better protect their schools. By breaking down the features of some of these attacks and the community's involvement in the incident both before and after, a number of interesting patterns have emerged. These patterns are outlined below.

#### Patterns in Attacks on Education

**Pattern #1: While the overall picture of attacks on schools across the country (if the present small survey area can be at all representative) may seem confused and chaotic, local patterns are in fact quite clear.** Even when the stimulus for the attack is based on more regional or national dynamics, such as the armed insurgency, the nature of attacks on schools is most clearly understood on a locality-by-locality basis. There are several variables to the local context – such as the physical type of school and the gender balance within it, the involvement with the school of the PRT, and the community's preparedness for attacks – that create unique and possibly predictable circumstances in each locality. Furthermore, while many of the districts studied gave testimony of attacks or threats emanating from more than one source (insurgency, criminal groups, internal conflict, warlords, and/or cross-boarder incursions), in most communities there is *one* group named as the primary perpetrator, meaning that not all communities need necessarily prepare for all kinds of attacks with equal focus. Other factors, such as the method and timing of the attack also remain relatively consistent within specific localities.

**Pattern #2: When the attack is thought to be perpetrated by the armed insurgency, communities are more likely to feel that lines of communication with attackers could be developed if they don't exist already, and that some negotiation could take place.** Field assessment statistics further indicate that there is far less fear felt by community members to initiate contact with insurgents than with other kinds of perpetrators external to the community. The case studies collected of successful mitigation through negotiation with external perpetrators have been mainly with armed insurgents.

**Pattern #3: When the attack is thought to be perpetrated by criminal groups, community members often report a lack of any way of getting in touch with the attackers.** They also rank fear as an important reason for not attempting to get in touch. No successful mitigation of attacks was recorded by the field study through negotiation with criminal groups.

**Pattern #4: It appears that more attacks happen against girls' schools when the attackers are members of the armed opposition or internal community members.** Criminal groups appear to attack boys' schools much more frequently than girls', but this is likely an accident of statistics: if criminal groups do not deliberately target one gender or the other, they will statistically hit more boys' schools than girls' as there are over double the number of boys-only schools in the country. The fact that girls' schools are hit more often than boys' schools by armed insurgents strongly suggests that they are being deliberately targeted by armed groups and internal community members who are (presumably) not pleased with the idea of their girls receiving an education.

There are a further two patterns which emerged across the majority of communities surveyed, the first very strongly, and the second less strongly but still worthy of note. These are:

**Pattern #5: The vast majority of communities feel that the main decision-making and roll-out responsibility of protection mechanisms must remain local.** Many have a clear sense of what mechanisms would be more and less effective in their situation, and have identified the roles that they themselves could carry out.

**Pattern #6: Schools seem to be attacked nominally more often in those communities where there isn't a strong and unified sense of the importance of education borne by the communities themselves.** There may be a number of reasons for this that were not verified by the present study, including a desire to not overtly contest the ideology of politically-motivated attackers as part of an overall community protection strategy, or a genuine sympathy with that ideology within certain ranks of the community which can weaken the cohesion of those community-based protection mechanisms that have been put in place.

### **What increases the risk of attacks?**

The study also revealed certain factors that increase the risk of attack which, while not necessarily being relevant to all cases, should still be borne in mind during each local analysis. These are presented below.

#### **Risk Factor #1: Girls' education**

Although it would be far too simplistic to reduce our explanation of the attacks on schools phenomenon to an attack on girls' education, there is no question that the gender-based attack trend is strong and requires deliberate mitigation. In both databases and in the field survey, displeasure with the attendance of girls in the educational system is the most commonly cited reason for attacks in those instances when a reason is mentioned. Yet respondents in the field assessment as well as the evidence presented by various successful girls' education projects across the country clearly indicate that through negotiation, hostile elements within and outside communities can sometimes be led to accept girls' education. This process, and the conditions for its success and failure, must be studied in much greater detail.

#### **Risk Factor #2: Schools as a symbol of government**

According to a database analysis, government schools are without doubt more frequently attacked than schools run by NGOs, suggesting very strongly that they are attacked at least in part as a symbol of the central government. Threats often refer to a community's or teacher's collaboration with the government and threaten severe consequences should such collaboration – including the receipt of a government salary – continue. Although this study was unable to establish a firm linkage, a possible hypothesis is that the physical government schoolhouse structure may be one element of this risk factor, as most NGO schools are located in private homes or otherwise non-traditional structures. Until more data is collected about the type of structure attacked in each instance this correlation will be difficult to ascertain.

#### **Risk Factor #3: Donor and International Military Force involvement**

One of the most interesting findings of this study is the extremely high level of awareness amongst communities on where the funding for their school comes from. Whether the perceived donor or implementing agency is in fact related to attacks is an issue that should be explored further, as well as the accuracy of perceptions.

The engagement of the international military presence in Afghanistan in both new and well established schools is a related concern: visits of Provincial Reconstruction Teams and funding channeled through these entities are seen as clear factors that increase the risk of attacks on a school. Recorded threats have included messages related to such a relationship even when that relationship has not been solicited or even welcomed by the community.

**Risk Factor #4: Location**

School damage and destruction is in some cases said to be the collateral damage of a broader conflict taking place in the same vicinity where the school is located. Highways are often subject to armed fighting and the schools located along those roads, often purposefully placed there to provide easy access to various villages, suffer, as they become physical protection from those engaging in the firefight.

**Risk Factor #5: Lack of consultation with communities before the establishment of a school**

The assumption that communities are eager to receive a school, or that a school could be established in a more hesitant community in the anticipation of its eventual acceptance, could, according to the data from the field assessment, increase the risk of attacks. The study revealed that those communities which had requested schools were those that had been attacked less often. The specific reason for this must still be explored: it could be that a more committed community is more prone to investing time and effort into protecting its schools from outsiders, but the association between the community commitment and the broader insecurity levels of that community must also be assessed, as this may be an influencing factor.

## 8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

The following is a series of suggestions on how schools could be better protected in the future based on the patterns and risk factors outlined above. Although diverse in nature, they all stem from one overarching recommendation, which is:

**Education stands the strongest chance of being optimally protected if the analysis, decision-making and implementation power of school security is decentralized to the provincial, district, and community levels, with budgetary and technical support offered by the central government.** The findings of this study tell us irrevocably that the dynamics of threats and attacks can only be understood on a locality-by-locality basis, considering a variety of locally-manifested factors, patterns, opportunities and capabilities. The best planning will be based on these local dynamics. Protecting schools using too centralized an approach could be not only an ineffective use of resources (for example, offering negotiation training in those communities where no contact with attackers exist), but in some cases even detrimental (putting a police station close to a school in an area where the police themselves are a chief target). Support should be given to local governing bodies to enable them to make the decisions they need. The key is to ensure they are informed of all possible prevention and mitigation measures and how to access support to implement those they deem most appropriate for their situation.

This approach is to a large degree already adopted by the Ministry of Education, which has instituted SMCs, PTAs and School Security *Shuras* to take charge at a local level. But this network of mechanisms can be strengthened, not only through an increase in resources but also an increase in information. A much greater understanding of the effectiveness of these mechanisms must be sought, and where they're not functioning, it must be understood why not.

Almost all of the schools visited through the field assessment had mechanisms for community participation in place, and yet 70% of these have been attacked. What is not known is how many of the attacked schools had mechanisms which were functioning at optimal level, how many had non-operational or sub-optimal mechanisms, and how many had mechanisms which were simply inappropriate for their local situation. Without this breakdown, passing judgment on the model of the mechanisms themselves is not possible. There is a great need to look further into how these mechanisms work in different contexts.

The balance of the recommendations this report offers have been organized into three different blocks. Block 1 outlines recommendations for consideration at the community level; block 2 outlines recommendations for the central level and the Ministry of Education in particular; and block 3 offers more generic suggestions for any stakeholder involved in school construction and establishment.

### **Block 1: Recommendations for the community level**

1. **Engage in proactive awareness-raising about the importance of girls' education.** Ensuring that there is a strong and continuous promotion of education – and girls' education in particular – amongst local communities where such beliefs may not be shared amongst all is a step that may establish a basic protective layer for the school. Further public awareness-raising about threats that have been received and the strength of the security guard system can also be a deterrent to opportunist attackers.
2. **Increase the visible presence of security guards.** Security guards are seen to be a positive measure in all cases where school security is under threat, but additional emphasis might be considered in those areas where criminal groups (with whom little or no contact is deemed possible) predominate. Participating in the school guards program resourced by the Ministry of Education could be an option for those not already involved.

An important issue related to school guards is the use of arms. Field study respondents have mixed opinions about the engagement of weapons. National disarmament was indicated as the second most popular solution for the issue of school insecurity; at the same time, some respondents expressed the need for arming communities and their guards to effectively protect their schools. The debate is not easily resolved. According to some analysts, outsourcing armed protection responsibilities to civilians “has contributed significantly to human rights violations, exacerbated and extended current conflict, increased insecurity and social divisions within communities and sown the seeds for future conflict”<sup>41</sup>. At the same time, the majority of communities interviewed indicated that neither the national army, the police nor the international military forces provide relevant support in protecting schools. Thus, any decision to arm communities and their guards should be made with extreme caution.

3. **Top up mitigation measures at peak risk periods.** Findings from this research suggest that the great majority of attacks are carried out at night and in the months just after schools reopen in the spring. Particular projects, which could include anything from increased patrolling, physical protection of buildings to communication campaigns, that try to mitigate the risk of attacks at night and when schools reopen should therefore receive specific attention.
4. **Engage in preventative negotiations.** In those instances where potential attackers are known, community elders or *shura* members might consider establishing pre-emptive dialogue with the intent of appeasing, and ideally forging an agreement with, hostile elements regarding the continuance of local education. Cases of successful preventative negotiations have been recorded. This, however, is not an option to be taken lightly, and only local community members will know whether this option is appropriate or would in fact achieve the opposite effect. Several communities involved in the field survey felt that this task was beyond their reach. Communities should therefore not be forced to enter into negotiations that they feel uncomfortable with, but rather be given the tools they need to assist them in approaching potential attackers should they see fit.

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<sup>41</sup> BAAG, “Community Defence Initiatives in Afghanistan - Implications to Consider”, 2008

## **Block 2: Recommendations for centrally-managed solutions to school insecurity**

- 1. Provide support and training for communities on negotiation techniques and other risk mitigation measures.** While communities may bear the brunt of the responsibility for protecting schools, the Ministry can nonetheless support with required resources and skill development for those protection mechanisms the communities deem most relevant to their local situation.
- 2. Introduce a national education promotion campaign.** Field assessment findings suggest that some attacks can be prevented when there is a greater acceptance of education within the community and broader society. This may be particularly the case for attacks emanating from within the community, but evidence suggests that acceptance-based strategies have also worked with respect to attackers associated with the armed insurgency. As one respondent put it: “attackers should be made aware that the school is for the community, not for the government”. Importantly, there are recorded instances where external hostile elements have been persuaded to allow education to continue (but without specific details on what the defining factor was in such persuasion, generalized assumptions on this point should be avoided). However, such a campaign must be balanced with the risk that it may inadvertently associate schools with the central government more closely: an eventuality to be avoided, given those cases where this symbol is deemed one of the major targets of attack.
- 3. Consider the negotiation of a memorandum of understanding with the armed opposition.** Many respondents suggested that negotiating a memorandum of understanding with anti-government elements to exclude attacks on schools from the armed conflict would be an appropriate strategy. Negotiating with the armed opposition is undoubtedly a sensitive political issue and might be practically impossible. Nevertheless, it deserves to be explored as this was one of the mitigating measures suggested by a large portion of the over 4,000 people involved in the field assessment.
- 4. Revise the policing policy as it pertains to schools.** It should not be assumed that an increased police or army presence in the vicinity of schools helps to protect educational services or the students that count on them. While respondents in certain provinces (Balkh and Herat) thought that more police would help, respondents in others (Ghazni and Wardak) believed that the police would only have a detrimental effect, as they themselves are targets of attack and would serve to bring that conflict even closer to the school. The presence and involvement of the police in or near schools should be very carefully examined and appropriate corrective measures taken where necessary.
- 5. Undertake database improvements.** The Ministry of Education should increase the level of detail recorded in their database when incidents take place. Schools should be coded and the basic demographic information of their students recorded for easy trend analysis. Boys, girls, and mixed schools should be better classified. The donor, building contractor, and all involvement of the international military in the school should be clearly detailed. Whenever possible, details from the investigation regarding the suspected perpetrators and motivation behind the attack should be noted. It would also be useful to include the full content of night letters and what mechanisms the community is currently engaging to protect the school. Moreover, the classification of attacks should be revised and extended, and results of attacks should be clearly separated from type of attack. These improvements would significantly improve the Ministry’s ability to spot trends and make accurate decisions about how to support schools from being attacked. Finally, not all statistical analyses undertaken by the MoE are currently linked in a centralized system; for example, information on newly closed and newly opened or re-opened schools is not linked directly to attack information (which also attempts to record school closures as a result of attacks), leading to difficulties and sometimes inconsistencies in the figures produced.

6. **Restrict PRT and broader military involvement in schools.** In contrast to most of the risk factors detailed in the previous section of this chapter, the risk associated with the interaction of PRT and international military forces in schools has a relatively simple solution: the reduction or exclusion of their (at minimum, visible) involvement in the education sector. PRTs are not a necessary player for the functioning of education in Afghanistan. The money that is now channeled through the PRTs for the purpose of supporting education could be channeled through the Afghan government or civilian actors via non-military funding mechanisms. PRT decision-makers should equally weigh the importance of their internal objectives in the education sector against the increased risk that their association puts on schools.
7. **Review the School Guards Project.** An assessment of this MoE project should be undertaken to establish best practices and lessons learned from its first two years, in anticipation of a possible expansion.

### **Block 3: Recommendations for risk mitigation during the establishment of schools**

1. **Undertake community consultations.** Full local consultations should take place before the establishment of a school to ensure community acceptance and guarantee that local knowledge is the basis of decision-making regarding the mitigation of risk. Communities should play a central role in every part of the design of the physical school, local educational projects, and community participation mechanisms.
2. **Select discrete locations.** Schools should to the extent possible not be placed in locations that increase the risk of attacks. To reduce the risk of education being caught in the crossfire of conflict, new school construction and the re-construction of destroyed schools should be undertaken a safe distance away from main roads or large infrastructure projects that are likely to become theatres of armed fighting. Attention also needs to be given to schools in border areas that struggle with security issues related to cross-border criminal activity and armed opposition.
3. **Where possible, select discrete school structures.** Certain advantages have been suggested regarding the establishment of schools in private compounds or amalgamated within other structures. Such design choices make the school less visible to certain external attackers (although many do have an intimate knowledge of the local area before an attack); and not insignificantly, avoids the symbolism of the traditional schoolhouse as a government entity. Decreasing the visibility of schools could thus be a risk mitigating measure in high risk areas. Unfortunately, until further information is available on attack trends regarding different physical school structures, the degree to which this may help cannot be verified.

### **8.3 QUESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH**

**Best practices regarding community participation in the protection of schools should be gathered and learned from.** This includes in-depth case studies of the successes of the variety of community participation mechanisms currently in place and the external factors associated with those successes. Different negotiation practices conducted between NGOs or the Ministry and communities before they establish schools, particularly girls' schools, should also be learned from.

**Attack rates on different school structures (traditional schoolhouse versus community-based structures) must be analyzed.** Indications are that this factor could have a significant influence on the safety of education. However, until attack databases begin to record this level of detail, such analysis will be difficult to undertake.

**Those instances in which negotiation with hostile elements has led to the successful prevention of attacks should be thoroughly studied.** A broader analysis of what combination of elements contributed to individual successes – Attitude? Compromise? Intimidation? – would be helpful, particularly in those cases where agreements were reached with the armed insurgency. A subset of this research must focus on the successful negotiated protection of girls' education.

**Additional research should be conducted on the diverse drivers of attitudes towards education.** Particular attention should be given to tribal and family dynamics, formal and informal lines of influence, community groups, the role of religion, and other affiliations.

## 9 ANNEX A: PROVINCIAL PROFILES

This annex outlines provincial profiles based on the information gathered in the field assessment. If no other source is indicated, data is from the field study. Where response percentages do not equal 100% it is either because multiple answers or “I don’t know” were permitted responses. Response parameters are detailed in the main report but not in these short briefs.

### 9.1 Herat Province

#### Context

The northern province of Herat is mainly comprised of Pashtun and Tajik populations, with a small Hazara minority. It hosts one of the country’s richest agricultural communities. Smuggling and other cross border criminal activities are one of the main security issues.<sup>42</sup> The overall literacy rate in Herat province is 36%: 43% for men and 28% for women. Approximately 55% of children between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, 58% of boys and 52% of girls.<sup>43</sup>

In Herat a majority of respondents indicate that the security situation has deteriorated over the past two years (56%). Another 34% believe it is the same, while only 9% say it has improved. There are some slight differences within the province: while in the districts of Engeel, Kaysan and Kashk Rubat Sangi interviewees state that the security has gotten worse, people surveyed in Herat city and Shindand believe the situation has remained very much the same.

According to interviewees, the three main causes of insecurity are: criminal groups (39%), armed opposition (37%) and local conflicts (34%). In this regard, Herat respondents indicate that threats are coming from several directions. Eighteen percent of respondents indicate that local commanders constitute a security threat. This is higher than the survey-wide average (9%). The armed opposition is also attributed a less important role in Herat than in any other province. Only 37% perceive the armed opposition to be a threat (the survey-wide average is 83%). Within the province, the only district that differs in any substantial way from the provincial profile is Shindand. Here internal village conflicts came up as the most common response amongst interviewees.

Herat stands out as the province with the least community participation in the education sector in this assessment. Seventy percent claim there is a PTA at their school, while 30% claim there are no mechanisms for community involvement. This is substantially higher than the survey-wide average (4%). There are also substantial differences between the districts. Herat city, Engeel and Shindand all have PTAs/educational *shuras*, while Kaysan and Kashk Rubat Sangi do not.

#### Attacks

Herat lies below the average in terms of threats received by education personnel. Only 10% says that they have received threats. The districts generally align with the provincial trend, but Kashk Rubat Sangi stands out. In this district, threats seem to be quite common.

#### Snapshot: Herat

##### Situation

- Deteriorated security
- Community involvement in education is the lowest across survey area

##### Attacks

- Lack of awareness about threats to schools
- Explosions are common

##### Prevention

- Proximity of police considered preventive
- Strong belief in hiring staff locally
- Increased policing suggested a long term solution

<sup>42</sup> USAID Fact Sheet on Herat province.

<sup>43</sup> MRRD provincial profile.



With regards to the type of attack that most interviewees indicated, Herat distinguishes itself from the survey-wide trend. Explosions are according to the majority of respondents one of the biggest problems in the province (68%). This exceeds by a large margin the survey-wide average of 22%. This is also reflected in the data contained in the UNICEF database, where Herat is the second most heavily affected province in terms of percentage of attack by explosion.

Almost half the respondents in the western province say that they do not know where the threats against the education sector are coming from. According to the ones who did offer an opinion, 32% believe that threats come from within the community, while 25% say the origin is outside. This makes Herat the only province in the field study where threats are perceived to be mostly internal. There do, however, seem to be some differences between the districts within the province. In Kaysan and Shindand, interviewees believe that the threats to the education sector are coming from inside the community. In Herat city, the data indicate that the threats are external. External threats are unknown to more than half of the respondents (61%). The remaining respondents indicate both Armed insurgents (23%) and criminal groups (30%). District variances related to this issue are small.

Another indicator considered in this study's analysis was whether the community had contact with the attackers after an attack. Eighty seven percent of Herati respondents said that there has been none. Only 8% believe that contact had been made. The only district that stands out from the provincial average is Kashk Rubat Sangi where the majority believes that there has been contact (but it is important to note that the sample size here was relatively limited).

The reasons indicated for the lack of engagement with the attackers are principally: there is no way to contact them (47%); the attackers are not interested in meeting with the community (22%); and, the community members are scared to meet with the attackers (18%). District variances are small. Limited knowledge about how to contact attackers is again an indicator of distance between the community and the attackers, something that could indicate that community involvement will not prevent attacks.

### **Consequences of attacks**

On the whole, schools in Herat seem to be closed for a limited period of time after an attack. Ninety five percent say that schools have remained closed for 1-3 months. Three percent say they have remained closed for 4-6 months and another 3% that they have been closed for more than a year. There is little district variance.

The level of damage reported in Herat might go some way to explain the short period of closure after attacks. Seventy seven percent of respondents claim that damage to the school building was limited and only 7% state that damage has been more severe. A further 47% say that attacks have also destroyed tents used for teaching.

After attacks, respondents in Herat indicate that in the majority of cases there is no change in the attendance of either students or teachers (59%). Thirty nine percent, however, do say that the attendance of girls has decreased. Contrary to the survey-wide average which indicates that boys' attendance suffers after an attack (27%), only 1% of respondents in Herat suggest attacks have a negative influence on the attendance of male students.

## Prevention

In terms of prevention, Herati respondents have a positive attitude towards police involvement. The proximity of a police station is clearly seen by the respondents in Herat to be a measure that enhances the security of the school. A total of 80% of interviewees believe that this improves security. Thirteen percent of interviewees hold a more neutral position, saying that it does not mitigate the risk of attacks. Responses from the various districts all conform to the provincial profile.

Herat also scores higher than the survey-wide average when it comes to the trust in increased policing as a long term solution to insecurity (65% against the survey-wide average of 36%). At the same time, there is a complete lack of trust in the possible positive effect that negotiations with the armed opposition could have. Only 6% of respondents in Herat indicate this as an effective risk mitigating measure for preventing attacks on schools. The survey-wide average is 43%. Security *shuras* are seen as an important way to ensure school security (68%), and so is disarmament (33%). District averages also align to the provincial standard in this case.

Finally, respondents in Herat also believe that hiring staff locally is a suitable mitigating measure. Fifty one percent believe it would have a significant positive effect. District differences are negligible.

## 9.2 Balkh Province

### Context

The northern province of Balkh has a mainly Tajik population. Despite 30 years of war, the province has a substantial number of functioning hospitals, schools, and roads.<sup>44</sup> A high level of criminal activity is the main concern of the Balkh authorities and still remains one of the main factors of insecurity. The overall literacy rate in Balkh province is 44%; however, while more than half of men are literate (54%), this is true for just one-third of women (32%). On average 58% of children between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, including around two-thirds of boys (66%) and almost half of all girls (48%).<sup>45</sup>

A majority of the inhabitants in Balkh province (62%) retain that the security situation has remained the same, and as such the province differs from the others that depict a much gloomier situation. Thirty seven percent of respondents in Balkh do nevertheless claim that the situation has gotten worse, while only 1% believe it has improved. Shulgara and Deh Dadi respondents claim the situation is very much the same, while Chamtal and Balkh city respondents are divided between those indicating that the situation is the same and those indicating it is getting worse. In Nahar-e-Shahee, the majority believe the situation is getting worse. The suspected causes of insecurity are in line with the survey-wide average: armed opposition (54%); criminal groups (27%); and internal conflicts (12%). All the districts align to the general profile.

In Balkh, community participation in the daily life of schools is good: only 9% (slightly above the survey-wide average of 6%) say there are no existing mechanisms. District variances are negligible.

**Snapshot: Balkh**

Situation

- stable security situation
- Insecurity caused by armed opposition
- Community involvement

Attacks

- Armed attacks, arson and explosions
- Limited awareness about threats

Prevention

- Increased policing
- Hire staff locally

<sup>44</sup> USAID Fact Sheet on Balkh province.

<sup>45</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

## Attacks

According to respondents in Balkh, attacks come in various forms. Armed attacks (32%); arson (31%); and explosions (23%) are the most common according to interviewees. This is slightly different from the information available in the UNICEF database, in which arson and explosions are the only types of attacks recorded (apart from threats).<sup>46</sup> Similar to Herat, only 9% of education personnel in Balkh say they have been threatened. The threats have all happened in the same district: Chamtal.

Balkh respondents are also relatively unaware of where threats to education originate. More than half the respondents (52%) say that they do not know whether threats to education are internal or external to communities. The remaining half were divided; 17% believing they originate from inside, and 25% believing they originate from outside. There are slight differences among the districts.

Respondents are also relatively unaware of external threats: 62% answered that they do not know what the external threats consist of. Armed insurgents are perceived to be a threat according to 21% and criminal groups the same. None of the districts present any particular deviation with regard to this issue.

In this province, interviewees are even more convinced that nobody from the community has spoken to the attackers in the aftermath of an attack (92%). District variations are limited. The main reason indicated for the lack of contact with the attackers is that the community is unable to contact them (58%). However, Balkh respondents differ from the survey-wide average by more frequently stating that the attackers are unwilling to meet (36% against the survey-wide average of 15%) and scores significantly under the survey-wide average when it comes to explaining lack of contact with fear (3%). The districts align themselves to this broader trend.

## Consequences of attacks

As in Herat, the great majority (98%) of respondents in Balkh state that schools remain closed for 1-3 months after they had been attacked. Only 2% say they have been closed for longer (4-6 months). Though the duration of school closure is as limited in Balkh, the level of damage reported after attacks is higher. Forty eight percent report limited damage to the building, but 26% report more severe damage (namely destruction of the roof (13%) or complete destruction (13%)). District variations are negligible.

The majority of respondents in Balkh say that no changes in attendance occur after attacks take place (59%). Of those who report otherwise, girls' attendance is suggested to be most affected by attacks: 41% say that girls' attendance decreases, while only 6% believed boys' attendance decreases.

## Prevention

In Balkh, respondents are more or less unified in their positive opinion about the effects of having a police station closer: 86% believe this would be an effective risk mitigating measure. Similar to Herat, respondents in Balkh identify increased policing as a solution to the security problem (77%) while they have little faith in the effects of a memorandum of understanding with the armed opposition (3%). They also see the possibility for change through disarmament (64%) and establishing security *shuras* (52%). The internal variations between districts within the province are small.

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<sup>46</sup> Armed attacks do not figure amongst the original classifications in the UNICEF database, which could lead to an under reporting of such attacks. However, even by going through the incident reports, armed attacks in Herat were limited.

Hiring staff locally is seen as a viable risk mitigating strategy by 95% of respondents. The majority of these feel that it will have a significant impact (62%). All districts are positive to the idea of local hire, and there are only limited differences as to the perceived degree of positive impact.

### 9.3 Ghazni

#### Context

The southern province of Ghazni is one of the more densely populated provinces of Afghanistan. Ghazni's majority population is Pashtun with Tajik and Hazara minorities. Ghazni's development has been hindered by political instability and the presence of anti government elements. Several natural disasters have also hit the province in recent years, including both severe drought and flooding.<sup>47</sup> The overall literacy rate in Ghazni is 35%: 48% of men and 21% of women. Forty seven percent of boys and 30% of girls between the ages of 6 and 13 are enrolled in school.<sup>48</sup>

Ghazni province clearly sticks out in the context of the general security situation across the country. No less than 98% of respondents believe that the security situation has gotten worse over the past few years: a finding which unifies all districts. The reasons for insecurity in Ghazni are slightly different from the survey-wide average. The armed opposition is given the most important destabilizing role here: almost all respondents (98%) indicated the armed opposition as a threat. However, the police are identified as the second most important cause of insecurity. Sixty one percent of respondents indicated this perception, which largely exceeds the survey-wide average of 13%. In line with the survey-wide average, internal village conflicts are placed as the third most important cause of insecurity in the province (30%). Internal conflicts are particularly prominent in the districts of Muqor and Ghazni city.

Community participation in education in Ghazni is almost complete: 99% of respondents state that they have PTAs/education shuras. This is also reflected equally across the districts.

#### Attacks

In Ghazni, threats seem to be more prominent than physical attacks; these are chiefly comprised of warnings (68%) and night letters (54%). According to the UNICEF database, Ghazni leads when it comes to reported threats. Paradoxically, the percentage of education personnel interviewed admitting to having received threats is below the survey-wide average (16%). District variances are negligible.

Ghazni is according to respondents struggling with both internal and external threats to the education sector. Ninety five percent of respondents indicate that at least some threats to the education sector come from within the community (this largely exceeds the survey-wide average of 31%) and 99% report having knowledge of attacks originating from outside. There is no doubt that armed insurgent groups are seen as one of the predominant security threats: the armed insurgency was referenced by 98% of respondents.

**Snapshot: Ghazni**

Situation

- Deteriorating security situation
- Police a security issue
- Full community involvement

Attacks

- Threats and night letters
- Internal threats to education
- Insurgents a factor

Prevention

- Proximity of police would increase risk
- More hesitant towards local staff hiring strategy
- Negotiating with the armed opposition is a long term solution

<sup>47</sup> USAID Fact Sheet Ghazni.

<sup>48</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

Diverging from the trends in provinces previously discussed, in Ghazni a majority of respondents (77%) say they believe community members have been in contact with those responsible for the attack. In Qara Bagh, Deh Yak and Muqor, respondents are unified with regard to the community having contact with the attackers, while in Ghazni city the respondents are more split.

While only a minority stated that communities had not met with the attackers in Ghazni, the suggested reasons for not meeting up are divided between: a refusal to meet on the part of the attackers (28%) and fear on the part of the community (16%). Ghazni city stands out as the primary district where these two factors overlap; the remaining districts are more in line with the provincial profile.

### **Consequences of attacks**

Ghazni schools stand out for experiencing longer periods of closure after attacks. The majority (82%) remain closed for 1-3 months, but 39% indicate that schools have also been closed for longer (4-6 months). Three percent say that they have remained closed for close to a year (7-12 months). In Muqor and Ghazni city schools tend to remain closed for longer periods of time. Longer periods of closure could be linked to the higher levels of infrastructure destruction in Ghazni. Twenty eight percent report serious damage to or complete destruction of buildings. Destruction of tents (50%) and inventory (56%) are the most common types of damage.

Attacks in Ghazni seem to have more serious consequences than in other provinces. Only 11% of respondents say that attacks have no impact on attendance. Boys are reportedly those whose attendance declines the most (68%). The attendance decline for girls is also above the average (13%).

### **Prevention**

Contrary to the perceptions of people in Herat and Balkh, in Ghazni the majority of respondents believe that a police station in the vicinity of the school would increase the risk of attacks (53%). Another 40% says it would not mitigate risk and only 6% believe that it would work as a preventive measure. This pattern is reflected at the district level. General distrust in a solution involving the police amongst Ghazni respondents is not surprising considering that interviewees have identified the police as part of the general security problem.

Ghazni also stands out as the most hesitant province with regards to the possibility of hiring local staff as a risk mitigating measure. While over half of respondents believe that such steps could influence positively on security, only a small proportion believe that it would have a significant influence (11%). Forty three percent believe it would have no impact.

In Ghazni increased policing is mentioned by only 26% of the respondents as a long term strategy to improve security. Likewise, respondents in Ghazni highlight the importance of negotiating with the armed opposition, and they believe strongly in the value of school security shuras. All respondents indicated both options as viable. Disarmament is seen as important by 64%.

## 9.4 Kapisa

### Context

The eastern province of Kapisa has a mixed Tajik and Pashtun population that benefit from the province's talc mine and fertile agricultural land.<sup>49</sup> The overall literacy rate in Kapisa province is 39%; however, while roughly 53% of men are literate this is true for just 23% of women. Approximately 60% of children aged between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, comprised of 75% boys and 44% girls.<sup>50</sup>

Respondents in Kapisa disagree on the evolution of the security situation. Forty five percent says it has gotten worse, while 44% believe it is unchanged. Another 11% (compared to the 3% survey-wide average) think it has actually improved. Geographical differences within the province are largely to blame for the divided provincial voice. According to most respondents in Tagab, the situation has deteriorated. In Nejrab the overall feeling is that the situation is improving somewhat, while in Allah Sahey the majority of respondents indicate no change in security.

The main security factors cited in the province in some ways mirror those cited in Herat: they are multiple and differ slightly from the survey-wide average. Armed opposition is again identified as the main cause (91%), but this is closely followed by local conflicts (81%). Criminal groups were cited by 55% of respondents. Contrary to the findings in other provinces, 45% of Kapisan respondents say that local commanders play a significant role (the survey-wide average is 9%). In Tagab, the main issue seems to be the armed opposition, while in the other two districts local tensions are more pronounced. One hundred percent of respondents in Kapisa say they have PTAs or an education *shura* at their school.

### Attacks

Respondents in Kapisa report a higher frequency of killings (23%) than the survey-wide average (10%). However, arson (62%), armed attacks (59%), and night letters (41%) are the main types of incidents. The level of threats to education personnel is moderate compared to the survey-wide average (17%) with threats reported principally in Tagab and Allah Sahey.

In Kapisa and overwhelming majority of respondents believe that threats are external to the community (95%). Only 13% perceive threats to be internal. The same pattern is reflected across the districts. External threats are mainly considered to be criminal groups (80%), with armed insurgents just behind (67%). In Tagab and Allah Sahey criminal groups dominate, while in Nejrab the armed insurgency is indicated as more prominent a factor by most respondents.

In regards to contact with attackers, 77% of Kapisan respondents believe that there has been no contact while 21% say they do not know. The main reason for lack of contact indicated by respondents is that they have no means of direct communication (55%). That communities are fearful (28%), or that there is an unwillingness to meet on the part of the attackers (17%) were found to be secondary reasons. On this

### Snapshot: Kapisa

#### Situation

- Internal security differences
- Insecurity caused by multiple actors
- Full community involvement in education

#### Attacks

- Threats and night letters
- Criminal groups and insurgents are the main problems

#### Prevention

- Internal differences on police involvement
- Strong belief that hiring staff locally mitigates risks
- Disarmament and security shuras seen as long term solutions

<sup>49</sup> USAID Fact Sheet on Kapisa province.

<sup>50</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

subject there are slight district variations, with respondents in Tagab and Nejrab primarily suggesting communication obstacles, while in Allah Sahey, fear is more broadly cited.

### **Consequences of attacks**

Kapisa respondents report longer school closure periods than average. Across the province, 72% of informants indicate that schools remain closed for 1-3 months and 13% indicate that schools are closed for 4-6 months. Eight percent indicate that there have been cases where schools have been closed for 7-12 months. Another 13% say that schools have remained closed for more than a year. These statistical variations are due to differences between the districts, where schools in Tagab and Allah Sahey remain closed for relatively longer periods of time, while Nejrab reportedly opens up schools earlier.

Although the province reports longer periods of closure, the level of damage is fairly consistent with the survey-wide average. Twenty seven percent of respondents state that damage to buildings has been limited. Sixty seven percent and 57% highlight destruction to inventory and tents respectively. Sixty eight percent of respondents in Kapisa report that attacks do not have particular consequences for attendance; but 32% say that girls' attendance does decrease.

### **Prevention**

Kapisa respondents are divided with regard to the prospect of increased policing in the area as risk mitigating measure: 44% believe that the proximity of a police station will not have any positive impact in terms of security, while 38% believe it could be a mitigating factor. Seventeen percent believe it would increase the risk for attacks. As above, different opinions amongst the districts explains this variance. Respondents in Tagab do not believe in increased policing, in Nejrab respondents are divided while in Allah Sahey people agree with the strategy.

Respondents in Kapisa believe in hiring staff locally: 97% believe this would have a significant positive impact. Nobody indicated that they think it would have no impact. They also focus mainly on disarmament (85%) and establishment of security shuras (80%) as long term solutions to schools security.

## 9.5 Khost

### Context

Khost province is located in the southeast part of the country along the Pakistan border. The province has been a main passing point for internally displaced peoples and continues to host a number of refugee camps.<sup>51</sup> The overall literacy rate in Khost province is 28%, with a substantial gender divide: 44% of men and 7% of women. Thirty eight percent of children between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, of which 61% are boys and 14% are girls.<sup>52</sup>

Similar to Ghazni, interviewees in Khost are quite negative regarding the security situation. No less than 94% believe the situation has deteriorated. Criminal groups and the armed opposition are assigned 98% and 94% of the blame respectively. Respondents in Khost are also the only informants that highlighted mines as a significant problem (66%). Surprisingly, none of the respondents indicated local conflicts as a security factor. The voice from Khost is unified: security has deteriorated in all districts (94%). One hundred percent of respondents declared the presence of a PTA or education *shura* at their school.

### Attacks

With regard to the nature of attacks, findings are equally distributed between: night letters (53%); arson (41%); warnings (39%); and armed attacks (35%). Khost stands out as the province where the majority of personnel confirm to having personally received threats (58%). In Qalandar district, all interviewed education personnel had received threats.<sup>53</sup>

Ninety five percent of respondents said that threats to education are external to the community, and on this there is uniformity amongst the different districts. Criminal groups are suggested as the greatest perpetrator. Only 1% of interviewees indicated the armed insurgents as a threat. This is particularly interesting given that amongst all of the provinces surveyed Khost is currently suffering most directly from the conflict between the insurgents and the armed forces.

In Khost, not a single informant indicated that community members have been in contact with the attackers. The main reason for this lack of communication is fear, according to 96%.

### Consequences of attacks

The totality of respondents in Khost says that schools remain closed for 1-3 months, and the province is very much in line with the survey-wide average regarding damage from attacks. Destruction of inventory (69%); destruction of tents (44%) and limited damage to school buildings (42%) are the most common results of attacks.

### Snapshot: Khost

#### Situation

- Deteriorating security situation
- Criminal groups and armed opposition main sources of insecurity
- Full community involvement in education

#### Attacks

- Threats, arson and night letters
- Criminal groups threatening schools

#### Prevention

- Internal differences in opinion on police involvement
- Strong belief that hiring staff locally mitigates risks
- No faith in disarmament

<sup>51</sup> USAID Fact Sheet on Khost province.

<sup>52</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

<sup>53</sup> N.B. – this was a small sample size



In terms of impact on the attendance of students and teachers in Khost, boys are reportedly more vulnerable than girls. Fifty eight percent says that fewer boys to school as a result of the attack, while 46% indicate that girls' attendance has decreased. Moreover, male teachers (8%) tend to stop going to work more often than female teachers (1%). Only 29% says there are no consequences.

## Prevention

Khost is also a divided province when it comes to opinion on the effect of policing. Only 21% believe a police checkpoint close to the school could increase school security. Seventy seven percent feel that this would have no effect, and only 1% believe that it would have a negative impact. In Khost city, however, there a significantly more positive attitude towards the police.

Almost all respondents indicate that they believe hiring locally is a good strategy to avoid attacks: a total of 98% say this could have a significant positive impact. None of the respondents think that hiring locally would have no impact.

Contrary to respondents in other provinces, Khost respondents have little faith in disarmament; only 4% of respondents believe that this would be a viable option. For them, security *shuras* (98%) and negotiation with the attackers (90%) are the only viable strategies.

## 9.6 Kunar

### Context

The small province of Kunar, rich in mineral resources and mines, is located along the Pakistani border. Kunar hosts a mainly Pashtun population, with minority Gujar and Mushwani groups.<sup>54</sup> The overall literacy rate in Kunar province is 21%, 47% of whom are men and 18% of whom are women. Forty three percent of children between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, 51% of boys and 36% of girls.<sup>55</sup>

The general security situation depicted in Kunar is not good: 88% think the situation has gotten worse and this is reflected in every district. The causes indicated are very much in line with the survey-wide average: armed opposition (94%) and criminal groups (61%). A slight difference is that mines are considered the third most important factor (17%).

Respondents in Kunar also say that they are 100% covered with regards to mechanism for community engagement in education. All respondents indicated that they had either a PTA or an education shura in their schools.

### Attacks

In Kunar, arson stands out as the most damaging kind of attack on schools (67% against the survey-wide average of 38%). Night letters (37%) and killings (22%) are the other types that are most frequently

### Snapshot: Kunar

#### Situation

- Deteriorating security situation
- Armed opposition is the main source of insecurity
- Full community involvement in education

#### Attacks

- Arson of facilities is common
- Armed insurgents is the main problem for the education sector

#### Prevention

- Increased policing will increase risk
- Strong belief that hiring staff locally mitigates risks
- Solutions: disarmament and security shuras

<sup>54</sup> USAID Fact Sheet Kunar.

<sup>55</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

mentioned. Threats made to education personnel are also quite common in Kunar: 21% of its education personnel admit to having been threatened. According to the UNICEF database, Kunar is the third hardest hit province when it comes to arson attacks.

Respondents in Kunar also identify threats as mainly coming from outside (91%), while only 14% say the threats are internal to the community. The main groups causing insecurity are again seen to be the armed insurgents (72%) and criminal groups (53%).

In Kunar, the percentage of respondents indicating belief that community members have spoken to the attackers is a bit higher than in the previously mentioned provinces, at 13%. However, as elsewhere, the vast majority (82%) say that they do not think there has been any contact. The district of Ali Sheer stands out as an area where the majority believes there has been contact. Ninety four percent say that the reason for lack of engagement is that the community has no way to contact the attackers.

### **Consequences of attacks**

Kunar is in line with the survey-wide pattern when it comes to the period of closure of schools. A vast majority (92% of respondents) say that schools have remained closed for 1-3 months. The remaining 8% state they have been closed for longer (4-6 months). Despite short closure time, respondents in Kunar report more serious levels of damage than the other provinces. Thirty percent say school buildings have been completely destroyed after attacks, while another 28% state that there has been severe damage, such as the partial destruction of the school building (15%) and the destruction of the roof (13%).

In Kunar, the impact on attendance is worse for girls and female teachers. Girls' attendance is perceived to drop by 36% of respondents, while the attendance of boys is thought to drop by 22%. The attendance of female teachers is hit hardest in Kunar: 18% say that fewer female teachers turn up to work after an attack (the survey-wide average is 7%). That male teachers decrease their attendance is only perceived by 3%.

### **Prevention**

Increased policing near the school, as a risk mitigating measure, meets both optimism and skepticism in Kunar. Slightly more than half (55%) believe this would increase security, while 22% believe threats would increase with greater police proximity. Kunar respondents echo the overall positive attitude towards hiring locally. Ninety six percent believe it would have a significant positive impact, while only 2% disagree. Suggested solutions to improving school security are disarmament (79%); the establishment of security shuras (88%); and increased policing (64%).

## 9.7 Logar

### Context

Logar province, located 60 miles south of Kabul, is a Pashtun area periodically crossed by nomadic tribes. Agriculture drives the economy in this region, and its farmers cultivate a variety of grains and fruits.<sup>56</sup> The overall literacy rate in Logar province is 21%: 31% of men and only 9% of women. Twenty two percent of children between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, 30% of boys and 13% of girls.<sup>57</sup>

Logar is very much the average province in terms of perceptions of the security situation. Seventy five percent say it has gotten worse and 25% suggest that it has remained the same. Respondents in the districts of Baraki Barak and Logar city maintain that it is clearly worse, while Mohammad Aqha is split between unchanged and deteriorating. The two causes indicated are armed opposition (91%) and criminal groups (72%). One hundred percent of respondents in Logar say they have PTAs/education *shuras* at their school.

### Attacks

Killings are above average in Logar, at 24%. Otherwise, the province is largely affected by night letters (58%), arson (48%), warnings (33%), and armed attacks (30%). Some attacks and threats against personnel and students have been recorded, but only to a limited extent (respectively 2 and 3 cases). In Logar, as in Herat and Balkh, the threat level towards education personnel seems to be quite contained: 8% says to have received a threat and they are all from the same district of Logar city. Logar respondents are still divided when it comes to establishing whether the threat is internal or external to the community: 48% says the threats are coming from within the community, while 67% believe they are external. This split is reflected in all assessed districts of the province.

In Logar, 88% of the time, questions regarding the nature of the external threats were answered with “I do not know”. Of the few that answered with more concrete information, the threats were considered to come from both armed insurgents (8%) and criminal groups (7%).

Ninety five percent of respondents in Logar say that there has not been any form of contact with attackers. The main reason cited is a lack of communications (76%). Thirteen percent, on the other hand, also indicated that the communities are too scared to contact the attackers.

### Consequences of attacks

The vast majority of respondents state that schools remain closed for short periods: 94% said from 1-3 months and 6% from 4-6 months. Respondents in Logar are in line with the survey-wide average with respect to level of damage due to attacks. Buildings have suffered limited damage (95%), while inventory (68%) and tents (26%) are again amongst the most targeted objects.

#### Snapshot: Logar

##### Situation

- Deteriorating security situation
- Armed opposition is the main source of insecurity
- Full community involvement in education

##### Attacks

- Killings above average
- Threats to education are both internal and external to communities

##### Prevention

- Increased policing will have no impact on security
- Hiring staff locally will mitigate risks
- Disarmament and security shuras are suggested solutions

<sup>56</sup> USAID Fact Sheet Logar.

<sup>57</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

In Logar, the majority of respondents believe that attacks have negative consequences on attendance. This is very much limited however, to girls' attendance (46%) and female teachers (14%). Boys' attendance is only impacted according to 22% of respondents.

## Prevention

Well over half of respondents in Logar (68%) do not believe a police post closer to the school would help security. Twenty five percent say it would. Only 6% feel it would increase the risk of attacks. In Baraki Barak district, close to all respondents indicated that the strategy would not work.

Logar interviewees were a bit more hesitant, but still positive, to the strategy of hiring locally. Eighty three percent believed that it would have a positive impact, but the share of those who believe it would be more limited in character is larger (53%). Fifteen percent disagree with the strategy and said it would have no impact.

In Logar, interviewees focused mainly on disarmament (70%) and secondly on security *shuras* (54%) as preventative measures. Again, Baraki Barak district stands out as more inclined towards negotiation with attackers.

## 9.8 Wardak

### Context

Wardak, situated in the central part of the country, has a mainly Pashtun and Hazara population. During the war much of Wardak's population emigrated from the province and many residents have returned since the fall of the Taliban government.<sup>58</sup> The overall literacy rate in Wardak province is 25%: 38% are men and 10% are women. Thirty one percent of children between 6 and 13 are enrolled in school, of which 41% are boys and 20% are girls.<sup>59</sup>

Similar to Logar, Wardak is in the survey-wide average of this study: 70% of respondents believe the situation has gotten worse, while 25% think it has remained the same. Only 3% believe it has improved. There are some differences between the various districts in Wardak. In Sayeed Abad and Maidan, respondents clearly lean towards a deteriorated situation, while in the remaining districts, people are divided between unchanged and worse. Armed opposition is clearly the main reason for insecurity, accounting for 91% of responses. Police are indicated as the second biggest challenge, by 17%. Only 10% of respondents indicate that there is no mechanism for community participation in school management.

### Attacks

Wardak respondents indicate the highest level of arson amongst the provinces (60%). Other types of attacks mentioned are night letters (25%) and armed attacks (16%). Education personnel in Wardak are

#### Snapshot: Wardak

##### Situation

- Deteriorating security situation
- Police seen as a source of insecurity
- Strong community involvement in education

##### Attacks

- Arson above average
- Threats to education personnel
- Limited awareness of the exact nature of threats

##### Prevention

- Increased policing will have no or negative impact on security
- Hiring staff locally will mitigate risks
- Negotiation with attackers is the suggested solution

<sup>58</sup> USAID Fact Sheet Wardak.

<sup>59</sup> MRRD provincial profile.

also reportedly suffering, with 38% of interviewees in the education sector equally distributed across the various districts stating that they have been threatened. This is in line with the UNICEF database. Incident reports contained in the database are related to arson, explosions, attacks on personnel and students as well as threats.

Similar to Logar and Kunar, respondents in Wardak were largely unaware of the origin of threats: 60% responded that they did not know where the threat came from. However, of those who did feel they knew, 32% said that armed insurgents were the main threat and another 13% indicated criminal groups. Eleven percent said that they thought there had been contact with attackers after an attack, while 63% say that there had not. The primary reason cited for lack of contact is that there is no way to contact them (83%).

### **Consequences of attacks**

Wardak respondents largely stated that schools remain closed for short periods: 64% referred to 1-3 months and another 13% referred to 4-6 months. Three percent said they remained closed from between 7-12 months. Forty one percent of respondents suggest destruction of inventory is the most common result of attacks in Wardak. Another 27% indicate tents. However, buildings in Wardak also suffer from severe damage: destruction of the roof (11%) and complete destruction (7%).

Boys' and girls' attendance in Wardak are more similarly influenced by attacks than in other provinces, respectively 26% and 31%. Moreover, attacks are said to have negative impact on both male and female teachers (4% and 6%).

### **Prevention**

In Wardak, interviewees are pessimistic about the proximity of police forces to the school as a mitigating measure. Forty nine percent think it would not have a positive effect on school security, and another 29% believe it would have a negative effect. Only 6% believed this would be a viable measure to increase security.

Wardak respondents are also amongst the most skeptical when it comes to hiring locally to improve security. Twenty four percent believe that hiring locally would have no impact. But 68% says it could have a positive impact. In Jalriz district, respondents believe it would have a substantial impact.

Three quarters of respondents believe that negotiating a memorandum of understanding with attackers is a long term solution to stability and security (74%). Forty seven percent believe in disarmament and 30% in the establishment of security *shuras* as viable solutions.

10 ANNEX B: TABLES

The tables contained in this section present the data collected in the field assessment. In many cases, as outlined in the report, multiple answers were allowed.

Number of individual interviews/focus groups conducted										
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak	
Students	198	25	29	26	20	23	25	25	25	25
Teachers	202	25	28	23	23	25	26	29	23	23
Principals	158	20	20	22	20	19	19	20	18	18
District officers	31	3	5	4	3	4	4	2	6	6
Provincial heads	15	2	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	1
Shura members	155	20	19	20	19	20	19	20	18	18
Parents	230	28	38	29	23	29	25	32	27	27
NGO representatives	11	2	2	2	0	3	1	0	1	1
Police officers	19	3	0	3	1	3	3	0	6	6
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125	125

Existence of PTA/Education Shuras in schools										
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak	
PTA	890	85	115	124	108	122	117	127	92	92
Education Shura	424	0	93	5	93	121	11	56	45	45
No	63	37	13	1	0	0	0	0	12	12
Don't know	13	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	12	12
Other	11	1	3	0	6	0	0	0	1	1
NA	41	6	2	5	3	7	4	0	8	8
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125	125

Gender composition of individual respondents										
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak	
Female	67	12	7	6	0	18	0	24	0	0
Male	388	44	58	54	49	40	53	32	58	58
Total	455	56	65	60	49	58	53	56	58	58

Gender composition of groups										
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak	
Boys	3607	333	456	384	511	603	479	417	424	424
Girls	757	231	157	75	23	1	55	141	74	74
Total	4364	564	613	459	534	604	534	558	498	498

Periods of school closure after an attack										
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak	
1-3 months	340	37	48	76	33	38	33	32	43	43
4-6 months	57	1	1	36	5	0	3	2	9	9
7-12 months	9	0	0	3	3	0	0	1	2	2
More than a year	8	1	0	1	5	0	0	1	0	0
Don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Other	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
NA	626	89	95	38	72	90	88	96	58	58
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125	125

The main reason for girls not attending school									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
No girls' school	108	0	11	12	41	1	18	18	7
No female teachers	213	0	85	3	44	4	18	21	38
Long distance	183	0	98	25	17	7	10	16	10
Kidnapping	116	0	0	76	30	2	7	1	0
Threats	160	0	6	76	15	2	1	31	29
Suicide bombing	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Mines	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cultural Barriers	154	0	64	21	38	5	11	6	9
Other	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0
NA	713	128	32	48	45	115	97	91	51
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Changes in the security situation over the past two years									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Improved	32	12	2	0	12	1	1	0	4
Invariable	266	44	88	1	49	7	14	32	31
Deteriorated	714	72	53	128	50	120	107	97	87
Other	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	2
NA	9	0	0	1	0	0	2	1	1
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Main source and causes of insecurity									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Internal village confl.	182	30	11	39	81	0	12	6	3
Armed opposition	725	32	51	125	91	118	112	87	109
Local commanders	76	16	1	4	45	0	6	2	2
Criminal groups	390	34	26	1	55	123	73	69	9
Police	111	1	0	79	2	0	5	4	20
Army	14	2	0	0	0	1	0	0	11
Mines	119	7	2	3	1	82	20	1	3
Don't know	50	19	25	0	0	0	3	0	3
Other	37	10	0	0	0	2	1	1	23
NA	149	41	48	2	11	3	5	34	5
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

The level of damage to schools after attacks									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Completely destroyed	34	1	7	1	0	2	18	0	5
Half destroyed	19	2	0	4	3	1	9	0	0
Destroyed the roof	37	0	7	0	5	5	8	4	8
Limited damage	120	23	26	0	18	20	4	18	11
Destroyed inventory	126	1	9	10	20	33	11	13	29
Tent	129	14	13	9	17	21	31	5	19
I don't know	7	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	2
other	49	5	3	1	4	20	8	2	6
NA	690	98	89	113	81	80	64	111	54
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Decrease in school attendance following a threat/attack									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Boys	188	1	6	73	5	54	16	8	25
Girls	255	27	44	24	26	43	26	35	30
Male teacher	18	0	0	3	2	7	2	0	4
Female teacher	50	0	3	14	2	1	13	11	6
No changes	302	41	63	12	55	27	35	37	32
NA	317	59	36	24	30	35	52	54	27
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Would the vicinity of a police check point/office improve school security?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	410	103	123	8	42	26	67	33	8
No	402	17	12	52	48	97	27	88	61
Would make it worse	162	0	2	69	19	1	27	8	36
Don't know	37	10	6	1	0	0	0	1	19
Other	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0
NA	7	0	0	0	1	2	3	0	1
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Would hiring school staff locally minimize risk of attacks?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes, significantly	519	59	46	9	94	122	106	29	54
Somewhat	172	39	25	36	3	2	0	51	16
No, not much	91	12	3	34	0	0	2	15	25
I don't know	16	5	0	1	0	0	0	2	8
NA	9	0	0	1	0	2	2	2	2
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

What preventive measures could improve school security?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Disarmament	546	42	92	77	91	5	96	89	54
Security shura	699	86	74	120	86	123	107	69	34
Increased policing	352	82	110	31	32	2	77	13	5
Increased IMF involv	8	2	0	2	0	2	1	0	1
Negotiate with AOG	423	8	5	120	24	114	42	24	86
Other	14	7	1	0	0	2	0	0	4
NA	48	2	0	24	4	2	3	2	11
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Who is responsible for school security ?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Community	849	97	133	124	95	119	91	91	99
School gaurds	708	77	112	19	90	126	112	123	49
School admin	728	77	120	91	85	124	83	101	47
Police	316	72	114	26	27	8	51	11	7
Army	24	4	6	2	7	2	1	0	2
Government	451	8	76	80	73	112	32	20	50
IMF	10	0	10	0	0	0	0	0	0
Local shura	51	27	1	0	4	0	13	2	4
Don't know	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	1
Other	11	9	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
NA	30	0	4	0	3	1	3	2	17
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Are threats to education internal or external to communities?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Internal	281	30	22	124	13	2	16	50	24
External	681	24	50	129	98	122	102	70	86
Don't know	184	43	67	0	7	2	8	33	24
NA	115	33	14	1	8	8	12	25	14
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

What do external threats to schools consist of?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Taliban	357	14	28	128	69	1	81	8	28
Criminal Groups	331	18	28	3	82	122	60	7	11
Don't know	304	37	84	2	14	3	22	90	52
Other	2	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
NA	169	67	8	1	8	8	11	28	38
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125



Has the community talked with the people who threatened or attacked the school?									
	Total	HERAT	BALKH	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	140	7	5	98	2	0	15	0	13
No	692	73	126	28	81	118	92	101	73
Don't know	76	4	6	2	22	2	5	5	30
NA	112	44	6	3	6	8	12	24	9
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Why has the community not contacted the attackers?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Everyone is scared	179	14	4	4	29	110	2	10	6
They will not meet	102	17	50	7	18	0	3	2	5
No way to contact	372	36	80	3	57	5	80	58	53
Other	33	12	4	11	0	0	0	6	0
NA	337	52	5	106	7	13	39	54	61
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

The most damaging incident that has occurred to the school									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Killing	63	7	1	9	9	4	17	8	8
Terror	17	1	1	0	2	2	6	2	3
Kidnapping	27	3	0	4	3	3	11	0	3
Armed attack	143	5	33	3	23	38	16	10	15
Explosion	143	56	24	11	3	19	13	7	10
Burning	253	11	32	18	24	45	52	16	55
Warning	165	8	10	75	6	42	6	11	7
Night Letter	226	8	14	59	16	58	29	19	23
Other	18	7	1	0	0	2	0	1	7
NA	365	46	40	21	72	19	37	97	33
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Time of day of attacks									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Night	456	40	73	79	28	101	57	28	50
Day	124	37	24	27	6	2	19	1	8
NA	441	51	45	24	77	25	48	101	70
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Did you or anyone else in the community receive a warning prior to the attack?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	43	0	9	12	4	2	3	0	13
No	688	79	95	105	64	109	86	76	74
Don't know	55	3	7	0	23	1	1	7	13
NA	234	46	32	14	20	16	34	47	25
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

If yes, who was the warning given to?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Community	24	0	2	0	0	1	17	0	4
District gov	17	0	1	1	1	0	14	0	0
Village elders	24	0	0	0	0	2	14	0	8
Shura	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
School	33	0	6	11	1	1	0	0	14
Teachers	19	0	5	4	0	0	0	0	10
Students	7	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	2
Other	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
NA	419	128	135	14	20	16	34	47	25
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Have attacks been prevented in the past?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	40	1	17	0	3	13	5	0	1
No	811	81	123	128	62	98	103	121	95
Don't know	74	3	2	1	37	2	3	6	20
NA	228	43	135	2	9	15	13	2	9
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Have you ever been threatened?									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	72	5	5	8	8	29	5	4	8
No	276	44	49	43	38	21	19	49	13
NA	675	79	92	80	65	78	100	77	104
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

Girls' attendance									
	Total	Herat	Balkh	Ghazni	Kapisa	Khost	Kunar	Logar	Wardak
Yes	551	127	34	43	37	128	32	75	75
No	167	0	4	72	67	0	9	11	4
Many go to school	155	1	44	7	8	1	78	6	10
Few go to school	144	0	61	7	1	0	1	38	36
I don't know	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NA	11	1	1	2	3	0	4	0	0
(N)	1020	128	143	131	111	128	124	130	125

## 11 ANNEX C: RESEARCH TOOLS

### 11.1 Questionnaire

The questionnaires for the various groups had minor variances. This questionnaire contains the complete overview of questions asked.

1.	Questionnaire number:	
<b>Interview Details:</b>		
2.	Name of Interviewer	
3.	Phone number for interviewer	Phone:
4.	Date of Interview:	Day: Month: Year:
5.	Start Time of Interview	Hour: Minute:

<b>Demographic Information</b>		
5.	Province	
6.	District	
7.	Village	
8.	Name of local school	
9.	Gender of interviewee/ gender make up of focus group?	<b>Provide the number for each gender.</b> a. _____ Males b. _____ Females
10.	Ethnicity/ethnic make up of focus group	<b>Please provide the number for each ethnicity. Please observe peoples' sensitivity to this question and try to get the answer considering the working environment.</b> a. _____ Tajik b. _____ Pashtun c. _____ Hazara d. _____ Balooch e. _____ Turkmen f. _____ Uzbek g. _____ Other: Specify _____
11.	What other shuras are operational in your village? Five options	<b>Please do not give a hint. Multiple answers are acceptable.</b> a. NSP b. PTA, VEC, SMC c. Local Shura d. Clinic Shura e. Elders shura f. Cooperatives g. Cultural and social associations h. Don't know i. Defensive shura from schools j. Other: Specify _____
<b>General Questions on school:</b>		
12.	Does your school have a PTA/Education Shura?	a. PTA b. Education Shura c. No

	Three options	d. I don't know e. Other, specify: _____
13.	What types of educational facilities are available in your village?  Four options	<b>Please circle all that apply, multiple answers acceptable:</b> a. Mosque b. Madresa c. Vocational School d. Home school e. Government school f. NGO supported school g. Private school h. I don't know i. Other: Specify _____
14.	Has any school been closed due to insecurity? If yes, how long?  One option	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. No b. Closed: 1-3 months c. Closed: 4-6 months d. Closed: 7-12 months e. Closed more than a year f. I don't know g. Other (specify) _____
15.	How would you evaluate the quality of teaching at your school?  One option	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. Excellent b. Good c. Not really good d. Bad e. I don't know
16.	Are there enough teachers at your school? Please specify the number of male and female?  Two options	<b>Please don't prompt</b> a. Enough b. Lack of male teachers c. Lack of female teachers d. Lack of both male and female teachers e. I don't know f. Other, specify _____
17.	Do boys go to school in your village?  One option	a. Yes b. No c. Many go to school d. Few go to school e. I don't know
18.	Do girls go to school in your village?  One option	a. Yes b. No c. Many go to school d. Few go to school e. I don't know
	Up to which grade do boys usually go to school?  One option	a. Grade 1 -3 b. Grade 4 - 6 c. Grade 7 -9 d. Grade 10-12
21.	Up to which grade do girls usually go to school?  One option	a. Grade 1 -3 b. Grade 4 - 6 c. Grade 7 -9 d. Grade 10-12
22.	What is the main reason that girls are not going to school?	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> a. No girls school b. No female teacher

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. Long distance to school</li> <li>d. Kidnapping</li> <li>e. Threats</li> <li>f. Suicide bombing</li> <li>g. Mines</li> <li>h. Cultural barriers</li> <li>i. Other: Specify _____</li> </ul>
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Construction Information:		
23.	How many schools are built in your village during the last two years?  Three options	Please circle as many as applicable and write down # a. Girls primary school (#     ) b. Boys primary school (#     ) c. Girls secondary school (#     ) d. Boys secondary school (#     ) e. Girls high school (#     ) f. Boys high school (#     ) g. Mixed primary school (#     ) h. Mixed Secondary school (#     )
24.	Who funded the school in your area?  One options	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> a. PRT b. Afghan government c. NGOs d. Community e. I don't know f. Other: Specify _____
25.	Who constructed the building?  Two options	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. National company b. International company c. Other: Specify _____
26.	Did the community request the building of this school? One option	a. Yes b. No c. I don't know
27.	If no, who decided to build the school? Two options	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> a. PRT b. Afghan government c. NGOs d. Don't know e. Other: Specify _____
28.	Is the process of building schools continuing in insecure areas? One option	a. Yes b. No c. I don't Know d. Other, please specify _____

Background Information on Security:		
29.	How has the security changed in your village over the last two years?  One option	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. Improved b. Stayed the same c. Gotten worse d. Other: Specify _____
30.	If the security situation has gotten worse, request the reason with details.	
31.	How the security affected your day to day life? Please provide examples.	
32.	What is the main source for insecurity in your village? Four options	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> a. Internal village conflicts b. Armed opposition

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>c. Local commanders</li> <li>d. Criminal groups</li> <li>e. Police</li> <li>f. Army</li> <li>g. Mines</li> <li>h. I don't know</li> <li>i. Other: Specify _____</li> </ul>
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<b>Issues Affecting the school:</b>	
33. How many and which kind of threats did your school face over the past two years?  Four options	<p><b>Please provide the number for each type of threat.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. _____ Face to face verbal threats</li> <li>b. _____ Verbal threats over the phone</li> <li>c. _____ Written threats (personalized)</li> <li>d. _____ Night letters</li> <li>e. _____ Armed threats</li> <li>f. _____ Other: Specify _____</li> </ul>
34. How many of the following incidents have your school faced during the past two years?  Four options	<p><b>Please provide the number for each type of incident.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. _____ Killings</li> <li>b. _____ Kidnappings</li> <li>c. _____ Armed attacks</li> <li>d. _____ Explosions</li> <li>e. _____ Burnings</li> <li>f. _____ Other: Specify _____</li> </ul>
35. If your school has been burned, please describe the level of damage to the building.  Three options	<p><b>Please provide the following options.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Completely destroyed the building</li> <li>b. Destroyed half of the building</li> <li>c. Destroyed the roof</li> <li>d. Destroyed very little of the building</li> <li>e. Stationary</li> <li>f. Tent</li> <li>g. I don't know</li> <li>h. Other: Specify _____</li> </ul>
36. Why do you think the school in your village was being attacked? Please be specific and provide all options that you believe could be possible.	
37. What could be the reason for less frequent attacks on NGO supported schools compared to government schools?	
38. When the school has been threatened or attacked, who does the community refer to for help?  Three option	<p><b>Please do not prompt. Multiple answers are acceptable.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Police</li> <li>b. Army</li> <li>c. CDC</li> <li>d. Other shura who is not the CDC: Specify _____</li> <li>e. NGOs</li> <li>f. Community</li> <li>g. Local commander</li> <li>h. Opposition</li> <li>i. I don't know</li> <li>j. Other: Specify _____</li> </ul>
39. What are the main threats that the school administration in your community have received directly?  Three options	<p><b>Please list the top three threats.</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a.</li> <li>b.</li> <li>c.</li> </ul>
40. Following a threat, have fewer of the following types of people attended the school?	<p><b>Please check a box for each type of person listed.</b></p>

		Type	Yes	No	Don't know
		a. Boys			
		b. Girls			
		c. Male teacher			
		d. Female teacher			
		e. No Changes			
41.	Who is responsible for the security of the school?  Five options	<b>Please do not prompt. Multiple answers are acceptable.</b> f. Community g. School guards h. School administration i. Police j. Army k. Government l. International forces m. Local shura: Specify _____ n. I don't know o. Other: Specify _____			
42.	Do you think the vicinity of a police check point/office to your school would help security?  One option	<b>Please don't prompt and see what examples community give you, please note it.</b> a. Yes b. No c. They will add to the problem d. I don't know e. Other, specify: _____			
43.	Does your school hire its staff locally?  One option	a. Yes, all b. Yes, some c. No d. I don't know			
44.	If your school hires its staff locally, do you think it would increase security of the school?  One option	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. Yes, a lot b. Somewhat c. No, not much d. I don't know			
45.	What do you think are the top three things that can be done to improve the security of your school?  Three options	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. Disarmament b. Establishing a security shura c. Increased police involvement (additional check points) d. Increased International forces involvement e. Memorandum with oppositions f. Other: Specify _____			
46.	What role do you think the community could play to improve the security of the school? Please ask this with some other question, but write it separately.				
47.	What role do you think the government could play to improve the security of the school?				
48.	What role do you think the school administration could play to improve the security of the school?				
49.	Do the people who are causing the insecurity come from inside or outside of the community?  Two options	<b>Please provide the following options.</b> a. Inside b. Outside			

		c. Both d. I don't know
50.	If they come from outside the community, who do you think they are? Three options	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> a. Taliban b. Criminal groups c. Don't know d. Other: Specify _____
51.	Has anyone from the community talked to the people who have threatened or attacked the school? One option	a. Yes b. No c. I don't know
52.	If yes, what was the result?	
53.	If no, why not? One option	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> d. Everyone is too scared to speak to them e. They will not meet f. No way to contact them g. Other: Specify _____
54.	Do you have any social structure in your community that could be used for protection of any public facility in your village? <b>Hint: Interview please name some examples such as "Arbaki" or "Kandi".</b> Tell us about the structure Tell us who comprises the structure Responsibilities/jobs Does government recognize it?	

Incident Information (only for communities that have experience an incident)		
55.	What is the most damaging incident that has occurred to the school? Four options	<b>Please do not prompt.</b> a. Killing(s) b. Kidnapping(s) c. Armed attacks d. Explosions e. Burnings f. Explosion g. Threat h. Terror i. Night Letter j. Other: Specify _____
56.	When did this attack occur?	Night: Day: Month: Year:
57.	Did you or anyone else in the community receive a warning prior to the incident? One option	a. Yes b. No c. I don't know
58.	If yes, who was the warning given to? Three options	<b>Please do not prompt. Multiple answers acceptable.</b> a. Fully community b. District government c. Village elders d. Community Shura: Specify _____ e. School f. Teachers g. Students h. Other: Specify _____
59.	If they received a warning, what actions were taken within the community? Please specify what actions	



	took place and who carried them out. (meetings held, responsibilities distributed, actions taken)	
60.	Have other incidents aimed at the school been prevented previously? One option	a. Yes b. No c. I don't know
61.	If yes, please explain how they were prevented.	
62.	After the incident, what did your community do to prevent future attacks against the school?	
63.	Have you ever been threatened?	a. Yes b. No
64.	What did the threat consist of?	c. Face to face d. Phone call e. Personal written threat f. Night letter g. Armed threat h. Other: Specify

<b>End of Interview:</b>		
65.	End time of the interview	Hour: Minute:
66.	Do you think the interviewee/focus group is well informed about security issues relating to the school? One option	a. Yes b. No
67.	Do you think the interviewee/focus group was being honest and open about the answers provided? One option	c. Yes d. No
68.	Do you think that the interviewee/focus group seemed uncomfortable during the interview? One option	d. Yes e. No
69.	Please note any additional comments or reflections about the atmosphere of the focus group discussion. For example, did the interviewee/focus group seem nervous or was the conversation dominated by only one person?	
70.	I confirm that all of the information contained in this questionnaire was obtained by speaking with the listed shura members.	Signature of the interviewer: _____

## **11.2 Focus group guidelines**

### **Preparation**

1. Please gather representatives from the group you intend to interview and ask them if they would be willing to spend an hour and a half answering some questions about the local school (for students, ask permission from their parents).
2. Select 7-10 representatives from the group. Seek to select members who are likely to be participative and reflective.
3. Introduce the project and the goal of the research, and explain that the identity of individuals and communities will not be revealed.

### **Facilitation**

1. Ask questions and seek to get single answers from each participant before facilitating discussions
2. After the question is answered, give the group a summary of what you heard
3. Please make sure to involve all members of the focus group in the conversation and do not let it become dominated by only one person.
4. Make sure members are confident that their answers will not in any way be traceable back to the community and thank them for their contribution.

### **Finalizing**

1. Make sure that your notes are understandable and that the questionnaire number is filled in
2. Write down any additional observations made during the session, even though not included in the questionnaire. Where did the session occur and when, what was the nature of participation in the group?

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Ministry of Education, Deputy Manager of EQUIP  
Swedish Committee in Afghanistan, Health Advisor  
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Save the Children UK